Two Kinds of Principle of Alternative Possibilities

Year 2012, Issue: 19 - Kaygı (19) 2012, 133 - 137, 15.10.2012

Hasan Çağatay

Abstract

It is taken to be self-evident that freedom requires being able to do otherwise, by most incompatibilists, and some compatibilists; however, there are more than one way to interpret the meaning of “being able to do otherwise.” In this paper, two different versions of principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) are discussed: One of these PAPs is related to determinacy, and the other is related to supervenience. I defend that PAP which is about determinacy and, which is widely being used by incompatibilist has nothing to do with freedom, and the other PAP cannot be satisfied in a physicalistic world.

Keywords

Compatibilism, Determinism, Free Will, Freedom, Incompatibilism, Indeterminism, Principle of Alternative Possibilities

References

• INWAGEN, Peter van (1978) “Ability and Responsibility,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 87, iss. 2 (April, 1978), pp. 201-24.
• GINET, Carl (1996) “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing,” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 30 (1996), pp. 403-17.
• KANE, Robert (1989) “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, iss. 2, (December 1989) , pp. 219-54.
• KANE, Robert (1996) The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
• KANE, Robert (1999) “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, iss. 5, (May, 1999), pp. 217-40.
• HUME, David (1975) An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, third edition revised by P. H. Nidditch, New York: Oxford.
• MOORE, G. E. (1912) Ethics, chap. 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• MCINTYRE, Alison (1994) “Compatibilists Could Have Done Otherwise: Responsibility and Negative Agency,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 103, iss. 3 (July, 1994), pp. 453-88.