Litvanya’nın Hava Savunma Doktrini Üzerine Çok Boyutlu Bir Yaklaşım: Tehdit Algısı, Maliyet Etkinliği ve Stratejik Derinlik

Year 2026, Issue: ERKEN GÖRÜNÜM, 1 - 1

Arif Emre Örün

https://doi.org/10.17134/khosbd.1680761

Abstract

Litvanya’nın hava savunma kapasitesi, günümüzün çok boyutlu tehdit ortamında kritik bir savunma başlığı olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Kaliningrad’daki Rus askeri yapılanmasının doğrudan baskısı, NATO’nun doğu kanadında yer alan Litvanya’yı hem konvansiyonel hem de hibrit tehditlere açık hale getirmektedir. Bu çalışma, Litvanya’nın mevcut hava savunma envanteri, NATO ile entegrasyonu ve bölgesel güvenlik parametrelerini analiz ederek, maliyet etkinlik temelli bir savunma stratejisi geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yüksek tedarik ve işletme maliyetlerine sahip F-35 gibi platformlar ya da Patriot sistemleri yerine, çok katmanlı ve esnek çözümler olarak insansız hava sistemleri (İHA), bölgesel iş birlikleri ve envanter ortaklığı esaslı hibrit modeller önerilmektedir. Litvanya’nın sınırlı bütçesi ve demografik yapısı dikkate alınarak, Türkiye’den temin edilebilecek Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Kızılelma ve ANKA-3 gibi platformlar ile NATO uyumlu, sürdürülebilir ve maliyet etkin bir hava gücü mimarisi oluşturulabileceği değerlendirilmektedir. Deniz sahasında ise insansız hava araçları ile müşterek çalışabilecek silahlı insansız deniz araçlarının kullanılabileceğine değinilmektedir. Çalışmada, savunma sistemlerine ilişkin ekonomik analizler, jeopolitik riskler ve stratejik savunma doktrinleri bütüncül bir yaklaşımla ele alınmıştır. Aynı zamanda, sistemlerin toplam sahip olma maliyeti, bakım-idame altyapısı ve eğitim personeli ihtiyaçları gibi mali yük kalemleri karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiştir. NATO’nun döngüsel hava savunma konsepti ile Litvanya’nın ulusal kabiliyetleri arasında uyumlu bir yapı kurulması hedeflenmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, çalışma hem karar alıcılara hem de savunma planlamacılarına stratejik bir perspektif sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Keywords

Hava Savunma , İnsansız Sistemler , Savunma Tedarikinde Maliyet Etkinlik , Litvanya Güvenlik Stratejisi , Bölgesel Güvenlik İş Birliği ve Tehdit Algısı

Ethical Statement

Yazar, herhangi bir çıkar çatışması olmadığını beyan eder.

Supporting Institution

Bu araştırma hiçbir dış finansman almamıştır.

Thanks

Bu araştırma hiçbir dış finansman almamıştır.

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