1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi Ve Demokrasiye Geçiş

Abstract

Uluslararası insan hakları kurumlarına – bir uluslararası örgüt veya antlaşma- katılan devletlerin sayısı geçtiğimiz yıllarda artmıştır. Bu artış, akademisyenleri, devletleri kendi vatandaşlarına nasıl davranacakları konusunda sınırlamak üzere tasarlanan bu kurumlara katılmaya neyin teşvik ettiğini incelemeye yönlendirmiştir. Mevcut çalışmalar, demokrasiye geçiş yaşayan devletlerin uluslararası insan hakları kurumlarına katılma olasılıklarının daha yüksek olduğunu çünkü demokratik kurallar ile uluslararası normlara uyma kararlarını ciddi bir biçimde göstermeyi istediklerini öne sürmüştür. Ancak, devletleri, mültecilere nasıl yaklaşılacağı konusunda kısıtlamalar getiren 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi’ne katılmaya teşvik eden faktörlere çok daha az ilgi gösterilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, demokratikleşen devletlerin, demokratik reformlara bağlılıklarını göstermek için maliyetli bir karar olan 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi’ne katılma olasılıklarının daha yüksek olduğunu tartışıyorum. 

Keywords

• zorunlu göç,insan hakları,uluslararası hukuk,uluslararası işbirliği,rejim değişikliği

The 1951 Geneva Convention And Democratic Transition

Abstract

The number of states committed to the international human rights institutions -whether an international organization or treaty- has increased in recent years. This upsurge has led scholars to examine what motivates states to join these institutions designed to constraint them on how to treat their own citizens. Existing studies have argued that states engaged in democratic transition are more likely to commit to the international human rights institutions because they want to credibly signal their resolution to follow democratic rules and international norms. Yet, much less attention has been paid to factors that motivate states to the commit to the 1951 Geneva Convention that imposes restrictions on how to approach refugees. In this study, I discuss that democratizing states are more likely to participate in the 1951 Geneva Convention that is a costly decision to show their commitment to democratic reforms.

Keywords

• Forced migration,human rights,international law,international cooperation,regime change

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