Kurumsal Ahlaki Çöküntü: Yozlaşma Ve Yolsuzluk Üzerine Teorik Bir İnceleme

Year 2021, Volume: 10 Issue: 1, 133 - 168, 31.03.2021

Sara Onur

Abstract

Kurumsal ahlaki çöküntü olarak yozlaşma ve yolsuzluğun incelendiği bu çalışmada, düşük düzeyde yolsuzluk olarak, devlet memurlarının rüşvet, görevini kötüye kullanma ve dolandırıcılık gibi faaliyetlerinin, kurumsal ve ülke düzeyinde yaygınlaşmasının yozlaşmaya neden olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır. Yolsuzluk ve yozlaşmanın ekonomik olarak etkin ve verimli bir ortama engel olduğunu ve yönetimle halk arasındaki bağı zayıflattığı gözlemlenmektedir. Adalet, eşitlik, şeffaflık ve dürüstlük gibi normatif üst değerlerin uygulanması, ülkenin ve insanlarının “orman kanunları” yerine, objektif kurallara göre yaşamasını sağlamaktadır.

Keywords

Yozlaşma,, Yolsuzluk, Politik Kutuplaşma, Ahlaki Çöküntü

Institutional Moral Hazard: A Theoretical Review On Corruption And Degeneration

Abstract

In this paper, which examines corruption and degeneration as the institutional moral hazard, it is concluded that the spread of activities such as bribery, abuse of office and fraud of civil servants at the institutional and country level cause corruption at a low level. It is observed that corruption and degeneration prevent an economically efficient and productive environment and weaken the bond between the administration and the people. The implementation of normative higher values such as justice, equality, transparency and honesty ensures that the country and its people live according to objective rules instead of “jungle laws”.

Keywords

Corruption, Degeneration, Political Polarization, Moral Hazard

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