Türkiye’de Ordunun Demokratik Kontrolü: Askeri Seçkinlerin Atanma Usulleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Yıl 2017, Sayı: 85, 5 - 35, 01.04.2017

Ahmet Barbak

Öz

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de askeri seçkinlerin demokratik kontrol durumunu atanma usulleri üzerinden incelemektedir. Çalışmada askeri seçkinler, ordu içerisinde üst düzey yönetici konumunda olan asker kişileri ifade etmektedir. Temsili demokratik sistemde atanmışlar ile seçilmişler arasındaki ilişkinin temel kurucu ilkesi olarak nitelenebilecek olan demokratik kontrol, siyasi seçkinler ile atamaya tabi olan askeri seçkinler arasındaki ilişkileri de kapsamaktadır. Bu çerçevede, askeri seçkinlerin atanma usulleri, ordunun demokratik kontrolünün bileşenlerinden birisi olarak kabul edilebilir. Türkiye’de askeri seçkinlerin atanma usulleri incelenerek ordunun demokratik kontrol durumu hakkında çıkarımlarda bulunmak mümkündür. İnceleme göstermektedir ki, 2000’li yıllarda Türkiye’de ordunun dikey demokratik kontrolünde ilerleme ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu ise, siyasi seçkinlerde askeri seçkinler karşısında bir otorite yoğunlaşması ve merkezileşmeyle gerçekleştirilmiştir

Anahtar Kelimeler

Demokratik Kontrol, Ordu, Askeri Seçkinler, Türkiye

Democratic Control of Military in Turkey: A Survey On Assignment Procedures Of Military Elites

Öz

This study investigates the state of democratic control of military in Turkey through assignment procedures of military elites. In the study, military elites denote the high level managers of military. Democratic control, which can be described as the founding principle of relationship between the elected and appointed, encompasses the relationships between political elites and military elites assigned to some military positions. In this context, the assignment procedures of military elites can be adopted as one of the components of democratic control of the military. So it is likely to infer some conlusions regarding democratic control of military by examining appointment procedures of military elites in Turkey. The study demonstrates that there has been a progress in providing vertical democratic control of military in Turkey. This has been realized by concentrating authority and centralization in favour of political elites against military elites

Anahtar Kelimeler

Democratic Control, Military, Military Elites, Turkey

Kaynakça

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