Iran’s Proxy Warfare Strategy in Palestine: Analyzing Support for Islamic Resistance

Year 2025, Volume: 12 Issue: 3, 1043 - 1059, 30.09.2025

Melih Kazdal

Abstract

Since 1979, Iran's strong Shiite identity has made its support for the Sunni Palestinian cause particularly remarkable. Despite over four decades of support of Iran to the Palestinian groups there are still some gaps in the literature required to be fulfilled. This study aims to uncover why and how Iran supports Palestinian resistance groups through the lens of proxy war conceptualization. In the literature, Iran's benefactor-proxy relationship with Hamas and Islamic Jihad is often discussed briefly and superficially under the broader context of Palestinian groups within Iran's proxy war strategy. Consequently, this study is distinguished by its focus on analyzing Iran’s support for Palestinian groups from the perspective of a proxy war, as opposed to the examination of their relationship. This approach sets it apart from other works in this field. In analyzing Iran’s proxy war strategy in Palestine, Andrew Mumford’s quadrilateral framework is employed, which encompasses the provision of manpower, the military assistance, financial support and non-military support. The study’s analytical clarity was ensured by using this framework.

Keywords

Proxy Warfare , Iran , Palestine , Hamas , Islamic Jihad

Ethical Statement

Ethics Committee approval was not required for this study. The author declares that the study was conducted in accordance with research and publication ethics. The author confirms that no part of the study was generated, either wholly or in part, using Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools. The author declares that there are no financial conflicts of interest involving any institution, organization, or individual associated with this article. The author affirms that the entire research process was performed by the sole declared author of the study.

Thanks

I would like to thank Menderes Kurt, Ersin Aksoy and Mehmet Rakipoğlu for their contributions.

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