A UTILITARIAN RESOLUTION OF THE PARETIAN LİBERAL PARADOX

Year 1999, , 101 - 103, 20.01.1999

Ahmet Kara

https://doi.org/10.14783/maruoneri.685716

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Bu makale, kişi hak ve özgürlükleri ile Pareto etkinlik arasında belirli şartlarda bir çelişki öngören “Paretian Liberal Paradoksu“nun, ilgili hak ve özgürlüklerin pozitif net toplam (toplumsal) fayda üretmeleri koşulu altında ortadan kalkacağım kanıtlamaktadır.

Keywords

Utilitarian resolution, Paretian liberal paradox

References

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