Why Does Consciousness Exist: A Teleo-Functional Analysis

Year 2019, Volume: 2 Issue: 2, 213 - 230, 30.12.2019

Ferhat Onur

Abstract

Consciousness exists. But it might not have. We could have been zombies. But instead we are experiencing beings. The question of why consciousness exists is one of the most important and interesting questions that can be asked about consciousness. Its importance is clear. The reason for its being interesting is that although the initial answer seems to be quite obvious, thinking about it reveals how complicated the issue is. If we are investigating the supposedly biological phenomena of consciousness, we have to go back in time and think about the moment it first emerged and question its evolutionary advantage for the organism. Accordingly, phenomenological consciousness may not have an etiological function, and therefore no adaptive value. Moreover, it may not be an evolutionary product, as it is unlikely to occur with genetic variation. This raises the idea that consciousness is not a strictly biological phenomena.

Keywords

phenomenal consciousness, function of conscousness, etiological function, evolution of consciousness, conscious inessentialism, zombie, epiphenomenalism

Bilinç Neden Var: Teleo-İşlevsel Bir Analiz

Abstract

Bilinç var. Fakat olmayabilirdi. Birer zombi olabilirdik. Fakat onun yerine deneyimleyen varlıklarız. “Bilinç neden var?” sorusu, bilinçle ilgili sorulabilecek en önemli ve ilginç sorulardan biridir. Önemi açıktır. İlginçliği ise, başlangıçta cevabı son derece bariz görünse de üzerinde düşündükçe ne kadar çetrefilli olduğunun anlaşılmasında yatmaktadır. Biyolojik bir fenomen olduğu varsayılan bilincin neden var olduğunu (etiyolojisini) araştırıyorsak zamanda geriye giderek ilk zuhur ettiği anı düşünmeli ve evrimsel açıdan organizma için nasıl bir avantaj sağladığını sorgulamalıyız. Buna göre, fenomenal bilincin etiyolojik bir işlevi, dolayısıyla adaptif bir değeri olmayabilir. Dahası, genetik varyasyonla ortaya çıkması olası olmadığından evrimsel bir ürün de olmayabilir. Bu da bilincin biyolojiyle sınırlanamayacağı düşüncesini gündeme getirmektedir.

Keywords

fenomenal bilinç, bilincin işlevi, etiyolojik işlev, bilincin evrimi, bilincin gereksizliği, zombi, epifenomenalizm

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