YENİ EŞİKLİ ÖZEL KÜME KESİŞİM PROTOKOLLERİ

Abstract

Günlük olarak kullandığımız dijital teknolojilerin miktarının artmasıyla birlikte, özel verilerin güvenli bir şekilde ele alınması ve işlenmesi her zamankinden daha önemlidir. Araştırma ve akademik topluluklar, Özel Küme Kesişimi (PSI) alanına odaklanarak çok partili hesaplamaya giderek daha fazla ilgi duymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma Cid-Davidson Özel Küme Kesişimi protokolünü başarılı bir şekilde Eşik Özel Küme Kesişimi'ne dönüştüren yeni bir teknik sunmaktadır. Bu dönüşümü, TPSI-1 ve TPSI-2 olmak üzere iki yeni protokol sunarak ve daha önce geliştirilmiş olan iki metodolojiyi kullanarak gerçekleştirmektedir, Reed-Solomon kodları ve Shamir-gizli paylaşım şeması TPSI-1'in temellerini oluştururken, Güvenli Karşılaştırma Protokolleri TPSI-2'nin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Özellikle, önerdiğimiz protokoller, sabit sayıda tura ve veri kümesi boyutuyla artan doğrusal iletişim ve hesaplama karmaşıklığına sahip oldukları için asimptotik olarak önceki eşik PSI protokollerinden daha iyi performans göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, özel veri hesaplamalarının güvenliğini ve etkinliğini güçlendirmeye yönelik sürekli çabalara katkıda bulunmakta ve dijital teknolojilerin hayatımızın her alanına girdiği bir çağda güvenli veri işlemenin nasıl değiştiğini vurgulamaktadır

Keywords

• Homomorfik Şifreleme
• Çok Taraflı Hesaplama
• Özel Küme Kesişimi
• Güvenli Karşılaştırma Protokolleri
• Gizli Paylaşım

NEW THRESHOLD PRIVATE SET INTERSECTION PROTOCOLS

Abstract

With the rising amount of digital technologies that we use on a daily basis, it is more important than ever to handle and process private data securely. Research and academic communities are becoming increasingly interested in multi-party computation, with a focus on the field of Private Set Intersection (PSI). In this regard, this work introduces a novel technique that successfully converts the Cid-Davidson Private Set Intersection protocol into a Threshold Private Set Intersection. It achieves this conversion by introducing two new protocols, TPSI-1 and TPSI-2, and utilizing two previously developed methodologies while the Reed-Solomon codes and the Shamir-secret sharing scheme are the foundations of TPSI-1, whereas Secure Comparison Protocols serve as the foundation for TPSI-2. Specifically, our suggested protocols perform better asymptotically than previous threshold PSI protocols because they have a fixed number of rounds and linear communication and computation complexity that increase with data set size. This study adds to the continuous effort to strengthen the security and effectiveness of private data calculations, highlighting how safe data processing is changing in an era where digital technologies are ingrained in every aspect of our lives.

Keywords

• Homomorphic Encryption
• Multi-party Computation
• Private Set Intersection
• Secure Comparison Protocols
• Secret Sharing

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