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PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO

Year 2018, , 43 - 50, 27.06.2018
https://doi.org/10.14780/muiibd.434948

Abstract

We apply Guney and Richter’s (2016) choice model of costly switching from a status quo to public

goods games. We find that non-zero contribution into the public good can be optimal under a status quo

contribution level. Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching cost

depends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.

References

  • ANDREONI, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, Journal of Political Economy, 97: 1447-1458.
  • CHARNESS, G., Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 817-869.
  • DUFWENBERG, M., Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, 47: 268-298.
  • GUNEY, B., Richter, M. (2016). Choice and Games with Switching Costs, https://drive.google.com/file/d/148r7XPBEFcgPO3w_D-RVSdVnFB2G7IhN/view?usp=sharing, (Erişim Tarihi: 5.12.2017).
  • JOHNSON, E. J., Goldstein, D. (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives?, Science, 302: 1338–1339.
  • MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1979). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods i: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, American Journal of Sociology, 84: 1334–1360.
  • MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1980). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods ii: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, American Journal of Sociology, 85: 926–937.
  • MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1981). Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, 15: 295–310.
  • MASATLIOGLU, Y., Ok, E. (2005). Rational Choice with Status Quo Bias, Journal of Economic Theory, 121: 1–29.
  • MESSER, K. D., Zarghamee, H., Kaiser, H. M., Schulze, W. D. (2007). New Hope for the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: The Effects of Context, Journal of Public Economics, 91: 1783–1799.
  • RABIN, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, The American Economic Review, 83: 1281-1302
  • SCHNEIDER, F., Pommerehne, W. (1981). Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96: 689–704.
Year 2018, , 43 - 50, 27.06.2018
https://doi.org/10.14780/muiibd.434948

Abstract

References

  • ANDREONI, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, Journal of Political Economy, 97: 1447-1458.
  • CHARNESS, G., Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 817-869.
  • DUFWENBERG, M., Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, 47: 268-298.
  • GUNEY, B., Richter, M. (2016). Choice and Games with Switching Costs, https://drive.google.com/file/d/148r7XPBEFcgPO3w_D-RVSdVnFB2G7IhN/view?usp=sharing, (Erişim Tarihi: 5.12.2017).
  • JOHNSON, E. J., Goldstein, D. (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives?, Science, 302: 1338–1339.
  • MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1979). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods i: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, American Journal of Sociology, 84: 1334–1360.
  • MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1980). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods ii: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, American Journal of Sociology, 85: 926–937.
  • MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1981). Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, 15: 295–310.
  • MASATLIOGLU, Y., Ok, E. (2005). Rational Choice with Status Quo Bias, Journal of Economic Theory, 121: 1–29.
  • MESSER, K. D., Zarghamee, H., Kaiser, H. M., Schulze, W. D. (2007). New Hope for the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: The Effects of Context, Journal of Public Economics, 91: 1783–1799.
  • RABIN, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, The American Economic Review, 83: 1281-1302
  • SCHNEIDER, F., Pommerehne, W. (1981). Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96: 689–704.
There are 12 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Subjects Economics
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Begüm Güney This is me

Publication Date June 27, 2018
Submission Date April 1, 2018
Published in Issue Year 2018

Cite

APA Güney, B. (2018). PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 40(1), 43-50. https://doi.org/10.14780/muiibd.434948
AMA Güney B. PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. June 2018;40(1):43-50. doi:10.14780/muiibd.434948
Chicago Güney, Begüm. “PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO”. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 40, no. 1 (June 2018): 43-50. https://doi.org/10.14780/muiibd.434948.
EndNote Güney B (June 1, 2018) PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 40 1 43–50.
IEEE B. Güney, “PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO”, Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 43–50, 2018, doi: 10.14780/muiibd.434948.
ISNAD Güney, Begüm. “PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO”. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 40/1 (June 2018), 43-50. https://doi.org/10.14780/muiibd.434948.
JAMA Güney B. PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2018;40:43–50.
MLA Güney, Begüm. “PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO”. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, vol. 40, no. 1, 2018, pp. 43-50, doi:10.14780/muiibd.434948.
Vancouver Güney B. PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2018;40(1):43-50.