PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO
Abstract
We apply Guney and Richter’s (2016) choice model of costly switching from a status quo to public
goods games. We find that non-zero contribution into the public good can be optimal under a status quo
contribution level. Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching cost
depends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.
Keywords
References
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Details
Primary Language
English
Subjects
Economics
Journal Section
Research Article
Authors
Begüm Güney
*
This is me
Publication Date
June 27, 2018
Submission Date
April 1, 2018
Acceptance Date
-
Published in Issue
Year 2018 Volume: 40 Number: 1
