PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO
Öz
We apply Guney and Richter’s (2016) choice model of costly switching from a status quo to public
goods games. We find that non-zero contribution into the public good can be optimal under a status quo
contribution level. Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching cost
depends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
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- DUFWENBERG, M., Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, 47: 268-298.
- GUNEY, B., Richter, M. (2016). Choice and Games with Switching Costs, https://drive.google.com/file/d/148r7XPBEFcgPO3w_D-RVSdVnFB2G7IhN/view?usp=sharing, (Erişim Tarihi: 5.12.2017).
- JOHNSON, E. J., Goldstein, D. (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives?, Science, 302: 1338–1339.
- MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1979). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods i: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, American Journal of Sociology, 84: 1334–1360.
- MARWELL, G., Ames, R. (1980). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods ii: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, American Journal of Sociology, 85: 926–937.
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Ayrıntılar
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Yayımlanma Tarihi
27 Haziran 2018
Gönderilme Tarihi
1 Nisan 2018
Kabul Tarihi
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Yayımlandığı Sayı
Yıl 2018 Cilt: 40 Sayı: 1
