2016 Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü Alan Oliver Hart ve Bengt Holmström’ün Hayatları, Nobele Değer Görülen Teorik Katkıları

Year 2025, Volume: 7 Issue: 2, 411 - 426, 27.12.2025

Seda Uzan , Mustafa Acar

https://izlik.org/JA49NT43PF

Abstract

2016 yılında Nobel Ekonomi Ödülüne layık görülen Oliver Hart ve Bengt Holmström'ün hayatları ve teoriye olan katkıları.

Keywords

Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü , Oliver Hart , Bengt Holmström

Lives of 2016 Nobel Prize Winners in Economics Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, Their Nobel-Winning Theoretical Contributions

https://izlik.org/JA49NT43PF

Abstract

The lives and contributions to theory of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, who were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2016.

Keywords

Nobel Prize for Economics , Oliver Hart , Bengt Holmström

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