2016 Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü Alan Oliver Hart ve Bengt Holmström’ün Hayatları, Nobele Değer Görülen Teorik Katkıları

Abstract

2016 yılında Nobel Ekonomi Ödülüne layık görülen Oliver Hart ve Bengt Holmström'ün hayatları ve teoriye olan katkıları.

Keywords

• Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü
• Oliver Hart
• Bengt Holmström

Lives of 2016 Nobel Prize Winners in Economics Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, Their Nobel-Winning Theoretical Contributions

Abstract

The lives and contributions to theory of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, who were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2016.

Keywords

• Nobel Prize for Economics
• Oliver Hart
• Bengt Holmström

References

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