THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS

Year 2023, Volume: 13 Issue: 1, 250 - 262, 31.03.2023

Ahmet Dinçer Çevik

https://doi.org/10.30783/nevsosbilen.1180069

Abstract

Use of thought experiments can be traced back to ancient times. Thought experiments are one of the important methods for sciences and philosophy. Although there is some consensus on the characteristics of the thought experiments, the same cannot be said about as to which mental operations should be accepted as thought experiments. Thought experiments are a widely used epistemic tool of scientific investigation in both the natural and the social sciences. Although natural sciences seem to appeal to thought experiments more often, the method of thought experimentation is not confined to the natural sciences. However, there is no agreement on the nature and status of thought experiments used in social sciences. Economics is a social science and most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. Indeed, at a first glance contemporary economics might seem like one big thought experiment. On the other hand, economics proceeds with models. In this regard, in this paper thought experiments within the context of economics is examined. Also, it will be argued that although there can be some borderline cases, it is hardly possible to consider all of the economic models as thought experiments.

Keywords

Economic Thought Experiments, Economic Models, David Hume, Milton Friedman

İKTİSATTA DÜŞÜNCE DENEYLERİ

Abstract

Düşünce deneylerinin kullanımı antik dönemlere kadar götürülebilir. Düşünce deneyleri bilimler ve felsefe için önemli yöntemlerden birisidir. Literatürde her ne kadar düşünce deneylerinin belirli başlı özellikleri üzerinde bir düzeyde uzlaşı bulunuyor görünse de halen hangi zihinsel operasyonların düşünce deneyleri olarak değerlendirileceği ile ilgili bir görüş birliği yoktur. Düşünce deneyleri doğa bilimlerinde ve sosyal bilimlerde yaygın biçimde kullanılan epistemik bir araçtır. Her ne kadar doğa bilimleri sosyal bilimlere göre düşünce deneylerine daha sık başvursa da bu yöntem doğa bilimleri ile sınırlandırılmamıştır. Tarih, iktisat gibi sosyal bilimler de zaman zaman çeşitli amaçlarla düşünce deneylerine başvururlar. İktisat sosyal bir bilimdir ve teorik iktisat disiplininde üretilen çoğu yayın düşünce deneyleri içermektedir. Hatta ilk bakışta güncel iktisat büyük bir düşünce deneyi gibi görünebilir. Öte yandan iktisat modeller ile ilerler. Bu bağlamda bu makalede düşünce deneyleri iktisat bağlamında değerlendirilecektir. Buna ek olarak her ne kadar bazı sınır durumları olabilse de iktisattaki tüm düşünce deneylerini modeller olarak değerlendirmenin oldukça güç olduğu iddia edilecektir.

Keywords

İktisattaki Düşünce Deneyleri, İktisadi Modeller, David Hume, Milton Friedman

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