The intelligence utilization of information, communication, and telecommunication technology companies: The case of Huawei

Abstract

This study examines how Huawei Corporation can be utilized as an intelligence tool in the field of information, communication, and telecommunication technologies. Analyzing Huawei's relationships with the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and intelligence-security services, the research evaluates the potential risks this connection may pose in the context of international intelligence. Covering the period from 2008 to 2022, the study addresses allegations that Huawei engaged in espionage on behalf of China, sanctions imposed on the company, and security concerns. Conducted using qualitative research methods, the study collects data from electronic newspapers, think tank reports, court records, and academic sources; additionally, expert opinions were gathered through semi-structured in-depth interviews. Content analyses conducted using the MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020 software reveal how Huawei's role in global information networks aligns with China’s cyber sovereignty strategy. Espionage allegations against Huawei, security risks, and their international implications are examined in detail. Security vulnerabilities in Huawei's telecommunications infrastructure have been identified as potential cyber threats in the intelligence reports of various countries. In particular, backdoors detected in Huawei equipment have been cited as national security risks. Furthermore, due to Huawei’s obligations under China’s National Intelligence Law, it has been found that the company could contribute to China's intelligence-gathering processes, which has been perceived as an international security issue by several states, especially the United States and European countries. The study's findings emphasize how companies in the field of information, communication, and telecommunication technologies can become counterintelligence challenges in intelligence activities.

Keywords

• Huawei
• intelligence
• cyber intelligence
• cybersecurity
• People

Bilgi, iletişim ve haberleşme teknolojileri şirketlerinin istihbarat amaçlı kullanımı: Huawei örneği

Abstract

Bu çalışma, Huawei Şirketi’nin bilgi, iletişim ve haberleşme teknolojileri alanında bir istihbarat aracı olarak nasıl kullanılabileceğini incelemektedir. Huawei’nin Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, Çin Komünist Partisi ve istihbarat-güvenlik servisleriyle olan ilişkisini analiz eden araştırma, bu bağlantının uluslararası istihbarat bağlamında doğurabileceği riskleri değerlendirmektedir. 2008-2022 yıllarını kapsayan çalışma, Huawei’nin Çin adına casusluk yaptığına dair iddiaları, şirkete yönelik yaptırımları ve güvenlik endişelerini ele almaktadır. Nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılarak yürütülen çalışmada, elektronik gazeteler, düşünce kuruluşu raporları, mahkeme tutanakları ve akademik kaynaklardan veri toplanmış; ayrıca yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmelerle uzman görüşleri alınmıştır. MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020 programı kullanılarak yapılan içerik analizleri, Huawei’nin küresel bilgi ağları üzerindeki rolünün Çin’in siber egemenlik stratejisiyle nasıl bütünleştiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Huawei’ye yönelik casusluk iddiaları, güvenlik riskleri ve bunların uluslararası yansımaları detaylı şekilde incelenmiştir. Huawei'nin telekomünikasyon altyapısında bulunan güvenlik açıkları, çeşitli ülkelerin istihbarat raporlarında potansiyel siber tehdit olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Özellikle, Huawei ekipmanlarında tespit edilen arka kapıların ulusal güvenlik riskleri oluşturabileceği belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca, Huawei’nin Çin’in Ulusal İstihbarat Yasası kapsamındaki yükümlülükleri nedeniyle Çin hükümetinin istihbarat toplama süreçlerine katkıda bulunabileceği ve bu durumun, başta ABD ve Avrupa ülkeleri olmak üzere birçok devlet tarafından uluslararası güvenlik sorunu olarak görüldüğü tespit edilmiştir Araştırma sonuçları, bilgi, iletişim ve haberleşme teknolojileri şirketlerinin istihbarat faaliyetlerinde nasıl bir karşı istihbarat sorununa dönüşebileceğini vurgulamaktadır.

Keywords

• Huawei
• istihbarat
• siber istihbarat
• siber güvenlik
• Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti

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