The Relationship Between Voting Power and Economic Growth

Abstract

The purpose of this study is analyzing the impacts of voting power on the economic growth in the political decision making process. In the study; it is proposed that the changes of voting power, which the parties in the assembly have, affect the economic growth. Voting power of parties calculated by the Normalized Banzhaf Index of Power (NBI) technique. In the period of 1987-2009, three different voting power indexes were calculated for the political parties in the parlements of 47 countries. According to results of the analysis, which was done by the panel data method, the increase in the voting power of main opposition party affects the economic growth negavitely, while the increase in the voting power of the government or the party that forms the government affects the economic growth positively.

Keywords

• Political Decision Making
• Voting Power
• Normalized Banzhaf Index of Power
• Economic Growth

Oylama Gücü ve Ekonomik Büyüme Arasındaki İlişki

Abstract

Bu çalışmanın amacı politik karar alma sürecinde oylama gücünün ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektir. Çalışmada politik karar alma sürecinde meclisteki partilerin oylama güçlerinde yaşanan değişimlerin ekonomik büyümeyi etkilediği ileri sürülmektedir. Partilerin oylama güçleri Normalize Edilmiş Banzhaf Oylama Güç İndeksi (NBI) tekniği ile hesaplanmıştır. 1987-2009 periyodunda 47 ülkenin parlamentolarında yer alan politik partiler için yıllık olarak üç farklı oylama güç indeks değeri hesaplanmıştır. Panel veri yöntemiyle yapılan analiz sonuçlarına göre; hükümetin veya hükümeti kuran politik partinin oylama gücündeki artış ekonomik büyümeyi pozitif yönde etkilerken; ana muhalefet partisinin oylama gücündeki artış ekonomik büyümeyi negatif yönde etkilemektedir.

Keywords

• Politik Karar Alma
• Oylama Gücü
• Normalize Edilmiş Banzhaf İndeksi
• Ekonomik Büyüme.

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