Yönetici Endeksi D-INDEX ’nın Firma Performansı Üzerıne Etkisi: Bist 100 Şirketleri Üzerıne Bir Araştırma

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, BIST100 endeksinde yer alan şirketler için kurumsal yönetim kalitesi ve firma performansı arasındaki ilişki incelenmektedir. Kurumsal yönetim kalitesi, temsilci çatışmalarını azaltan bir mekanizma olarak kabul edilmiş ve bu azalışın artan firma performansıyla sonuçlanacağı varsayılmıştır. Çalışmada, Yönetici endeksi DINDEX , kurumsal yönetim kalitesinin bir göstergesi kabul edilmiş ve çalışmayı literatürde yer alan benzer çalışmalardan farklılaştırmak amaçlanmıştır. Bu endeksi oluşturmak için Bushee vd. 2010 çalışmasından yararlanılmıştır. Ampirik bulgulara göre D-INDEX’in firma performansı üzerinde herhangi bir etkisi bulunmamıştır. İkinci aşama olarak, firma performansı ve D-INDEX arasındaki ilişki farklı endüstrilerdeki şirketler için incelenmiş ve elektrik endüstrisindeki şirketlerden yüksek kurumsal yönetim kalitesine sahip şirketlerin, yüksek performansa sahip olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Söz konusu şirketlerin kurumsal yönetimdeki değişiklikleri çabuk uygulamaya geçirmeleri bu sonuca ulaşmada etkili olmuştur

Keywords

• Firma Performansı, D-INDEX, Kurumsal Yönetim Kalitesi, BİST 100, Panel Veri

The Effect of Directors’ Index on Firm Performance: An Evidence from BIST100 Firms

Abstract

This study investigates the relation between corporate performance of firms listed in Borsa İstanbul 100 index BIST100 . With accepting corporate governance as a mechanism to reduce the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, we assume that this reduction results with increased firm performance. We differentiate this study from the existing literature by accepting directors’ index D-INDEX as a proxy for corporate governance quality for the companies existed in BIST100. We follow Bushee et al. 2010 to create D-INDEX. Our findings indicate that DINDEX does not have any effect on corporate performance of BIST100 firms. As a second step, we examine the relation between firm performance and D-INDEX for each industry in our dataset. We find that among the firms in electricity industry those have high level of corporate governance quality have high level of firm performance. We explain this result with the quick adjustments of these firms to the changes in corporate governance

Keywords

• Firm Performance, D-INDEX, Corporate Governance Quality, BIST100, Panel Data

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