The Relationship between Taxation and Democracy: Panel Causality Analysis for Developing Countries

Year 2016, Volume: 11 Issue: 1, 63 - 86, 01.04.2016

Salih Türedi Mehmet Hanefi Topal

Abstract

This study analysis the relation between democracy and taxation in the context of developing countries. At the end of empirical analysis covering 60 countries by focusing on the period of 2006-2012, findings showing a twoway causality relation between taxation and democracy were reached. Accordingly, an increase in taxation level affects rule of law, organizational right, freedom of expression and belief positively in the countries analyzed. Briefly, it plays a vital role in the development of democracy by making a contribution to the enhancement of civil liberties. On the other hand, improvements in democratic rights and freedoms increase the number of citizens paying their taxes in full and on time, thus increases taxation level, by strengthening the harmony between citizens and state

Keywords

Taxation, Democracy, Panel Data, Causality

Vergilendirme ve Demokrasi Arasındaki İlişki: Gelişmekte Olan Ülkeler İçin Panel Nedensellik Analizi

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, gelişmekte olan ülkelerde vergilendirme ve demokrasi arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Bu amaçla yapılan ve 60 ülkenin 2006-2012 döneminin dikkate alındığı ampirik analiz sonucunda, vergilendirme ve demokrasi arasında çift yönlü bir nedensellik ilişkisinin olduğunu gösteren bulgulara ulaşılmıştır. Buna göre, ele alınan ülkelerde vergilendirme düzeyindeki artış, hukukun üstünlüğünün, örgütlenme özgürlüğünün, genişlemesine katkı sağlayarak demokrasinin gelişmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Diğer yandan, demokratik hak ve özgürlüklerde sağlanan ilerlemeler de vatandaşlar ile devlet arasındaki uyumu güçlendirerek, vergisini zamanında ödeyen birey sayısının, dolayısı ile vergilendirme düzeyinin artmasına neden olmaktadır

Keywords

Vergilendirme, Demokrasi, Panel Veri, Nedensellik

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