PARMENIDES’ SEEMINGLY SELF-DEFEATING CONCLUSIONS

Yıl 2004, Sayı: 9, 181 - 188, 01.05.2004

Kamuran Gödelek

Öz

PARMENIDES’ SEEMINGLY SELF-DEFEATING CONCLUSIONS

Öz

Parmenides’ cryptic poem about the three different paths of knowledge
has been a source of trouble for philosophers since it was first written.
Countless philosophers have attempted to reconcile Parmenides’ words
and turn his poem into a cohesive, consistent philosophical theory. Perhaps
the most successful of all interpretations was suggested by Montgomery
Furth in his article “Elements of Eleatic Ontology”.
Parmenides’ poem presents three possible paths of thought, only one of
which is meaningful: “it is.” Furth proposes that Parmenides was looking
to present a theory of meaningful thought and speech and “it is” is the only
thing we can meaningfully think or say. Still, there exist opponents of
Parmenides’ method of discourse — and his conclusions therein. Their claim
rests on the notion that the very nature of Parmenides’ argument makes
meaningless claims which he boldly proposes in his poem. This paper will
lay out Furth’s interpretation and investigate one of the most troubling
aspects of Parmenides’ poem.

Kaynakça

• Cohen 2000 Cohen, M., Curd, p. and Reeve, C.D.C. 2000 Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle. 2nd ed. Hackett, Indianapolis.
• Crystal 2002 Crystal, I., “The Scope of Thought in Parmenides”, Classical Quarterly 52 (1): 207-219.
• Furth 1968 Furth, M., “Elements of Eleatic Ontology”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 6: 111-132.
• Miller 1999 Miller, M., “The Legacy of Parmenides, Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1): 157-160