AN EXAMINATION OF THE CAUSES OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS' COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Abstract

The changing nature of contemporary conflicts has resulted in the proliferation of non-international armed conflicts and the active involvement of non-state armed actors. For this reason, it has become essential to combat these groups and encourage them to act in accordance with the law. This study examines the motivations of non-state armed actors who comply with international humanitarian law in order to gain legitimacy and credibility. In this study, the FARC in Colombia and the JEM in Sudan will be examined and it will be tried to determine how they respect the law regarding child soldiers. With the aim of preserving trust in international humanitarian law and increasing respect for human dignity, the study will try to determine the reasons that push non-state armed actors to comply with international humanitarian law as a result of the case analysis.

Keywords

• Non-state armed actors
• International humanitarian law
• Farc
• Jem

DEVLET DIŞI SİLAHLI GRUPLARIN ULUSLARARASI İNSANCIL HUKUKA UYMASINA SEBEBİYET VEREN NEDENLER ÜZERİNDE BİR İNCELEME

Abstract

Günümüz çatışmalarının değişen doğası neticesinde, uluslararası nitelikte olmayan silahlı çatışmalar yaygınlaşmış ve devlet dışı silahlı aktörler aktif rol alır hale gelmiştir. Bu gerekçeyle, bu gruplarla mücadele etmek ve hukuka uygun hareket etmelerini teşvik etmek elzem haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma meşruiyet ve itibar elde etmek için uluslararası insancıl hukuka uyan devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin motivasyonlarını incelemektedir. Çalışmada Kolombiya'da etkin olan FARC ve Sudan'da bulunan JEM örgütleri incelenerek, çocuk askerler konusunda hukuka nasıl saygı gösterdikleri belirlenmeye çalışılacaktır. Uluslararası insancıl hukuka olan güvenin korunması ve insan onuruna saygının arttırılması amacı hedef konarak vaka analizi neticesinde devlet dışı silahlı aktörleri uluslararası insancıl hukuka uymaya iten nedenler belirlenmeye çalışılacaktır.

Keywords

• Devlet dışı silahlı aktörler
• Uluslararası insancıl hukuk
• Farc
• Jem

References

1. Arjona, A. (2016). Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
2. Bangerter, O. (2010). Disseminating and Implementing International Humanitarian Law within Organized Armed Groups Measures Armed Groups Can Take to Improve Respect for International Humanitarian Law. G. L. Beruto, & M. Odello içinde, Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law Organized Armed Groups: A Challenge for the 21st Century (s. 198). Sanremo: FrancoAngeli.
3. Bangerter, O. (2011). Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not. International Review of the Red Cross, 358.
4. Bangerter, O. (2015). Comment: Persuading Armed Groups to Better Respect International Humanitarian Law. H. Krieger içinde, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (s. 113). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Beck, L. D., & Henckaerts, J. M. (2005). Customary International Humanitarian Law. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
6. Bellal, A. (2019). The War Report: Armed Conflicts In 2018. Geneva : The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.
7. Bellal, A., & Heffes, E. (2018). Yes, I Do: Binding Armed Non-State Actors To IHL And Human Rights Norms Through Their Consent. Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 126.
8. Bellal, A., & Maslen, S. C. (2011). Enhancing Compliance with International Law by Armed Non-State Actors. Goettingen Journal of International Law, 175-197.

9. Bouvier, V. M. (2009). Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
10. Brodzinsky, S. (2017, 06 27). Welcome to Peace: Colombia's Farc Rebels Seal Historic Disarmament. Guardian, s. 2.
11. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (Judgment), ICJ Rep 392 (International Court of Justice 06 27, 1986).
12. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. (2008, 07 11). The Geneva/Darfur Humanitarian Dialogue. http://theirwords.org: http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_sd_jem_slm_a_unity_2008_18-9786ecfeda2b4605ff60bcdc4aab48b2.pdf adresinden alındı
13. Clapham, A. (2006). Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations. International Review of the Red Cross, 491.
14. Collins, R. (2008). A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Collins, R., & Burr, M. (2008). Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
16. Corten, O., & Klein , P. (2011). Are Agreements between States and Non-State Entities Rooted in the International Legal Order? E. Cannizzaro içinde, The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (s. 3-24). Oxford : Oxford Academic.
17. Craze, J., & Tubiana, J. (2016). A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
18. Dabone, Z. (2012). Le droit international public relatif aux groupes armés non étatiques. Paris: Schulthess.
19. Dunbar, N. (1955). The Significance of Military Necessity in the Law of War. Juridical Review, 201-212.
20. Flint, J. (2007). Darfur’s Armed Movements. A. Waal içinde, War in Darfur (s. 161). London: Justice Africa.
21. Forsythe, D. (1978). Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts. American Journal of International Law, 272-292.
22. Fortna, V. P. (2004). Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War. International Studies Quarterly, 269.
23. Franck, T. (1988). Legitimacy in the International System. American Journal of International Law, 705-759.
24. Frésard, J. J. (2004). The Roots of Behaviour in War: A Survey of the Literature. Geneva: ICRC.
25. Geiss, R. (2015). Scope and Content of the Obligation to Ensure Respect. H. Krieger içinde, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (s. 419). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Geneva Call. (2012, 09 26). Action Plan: Operational Mechanism to Prevent and End Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers. http://theirwords.org: http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/sd_jem_2012_55-b4f6cb533f33a9415cc738069a0efee6.pdf adresinden alındı
27. Geneva Call. (2014, 11 16). Ricardo Téllez of the Peace Delegation of the FARC-EP. https://www.youtube.com: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cExLLUx0V9c&feature=youtu.be adresinden alındı
28. Geneva Call. (2015, 02 03). Announcement on Minors in the Conflict. http://theirwords.org: http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/farc_ep_announcement_on_minors_in_the_conflicte6c1d31649e5c1560d3487a1740e48c0.pdf adresinden alındı
29. Geneva Call. (2015, 02 16). Geneva Call welcomes the announcement by the FARC-EP on a raise of the minimum recruitment age. https://genevacall.org: https://genevacall.org/geneva-call-welcomes-announcement-farc-epraise-minimum-recruitment-age/ adresinden alındı
30. Geneva Call. (2017). Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines: Towards a Holistic Approach to Armed Non-State Actors? Geneva : Geneva Call.
31. Guevara, E. (1969). Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Vintage Books.
32. Hayner, P. (2007). Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and International Center for Transitional Justice.
33. Hayner, P. (2010). Creating Incentives for Compliance: Between Amnesty and Criminalization. M. Odello, & G. L. Beruto içinde, Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law Organized Armed Groups: A Challenge for the 21st Century (s. 184). Sanremo: FrancoAngeli.
34. Heffes, E., & Kotlik, M. (2014). Special Agreements As a Means of Enhancing Compliance with IHL in Non-international Armed Conflicts: An Inquiry Into the Governing Legal Regime. International Review of the Red Cross, 1195-1224.
35. Holá, B., & Guzman, L. (2019). Punishment in Negotiated Transitions: The Case of the Colombian Peace Agreement with the Farc-Ep. International Criminal Law Review, 127-159.
36. ICRC. (2020). The Roots of Restraint in War. Geneva: ICRC.
37. Jo, H. (2015). Compliant Rebels Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
38. Kaldor, M. (2012). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
39. Krieger, H. (2015). Inducing Compliance in Areas of Limited Statehood. H. Krieger içinde, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (s. 512). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40. Kyriakopoulos, G. (2016). Formation Of International Custom And The Role Of Non-State Actors. P. Pazartzis içinde, Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, Resources, Investment and Trade (s. 49). London: Hart Publishing.
41. LaRosa, M., & Mejía, G. (2012). Colombia: A Concise Contemporary History. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
42. Lee, C. (2012). The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution? Latin American Perspectives, 28-42.
43. Mack, M. (2008). Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts. Geneva: ICRC.
44. Martuscelli, P. N., & Villa, R. D. (2018). Child Soldiers as Peace Builders in Colombian Peace Talks Between the Government and the FARC–EP. Conflict, Security & Development, 387-408.
45. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row.
46. Murray, D. (2015). How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups. Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 101-131.
47. Nagle, L. (2011). Child Soldiers and the Duty of Nations to Protect Children from Participation in Armed Conflict. Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 10.
48. Nikolova, M. (2014). Interview with Emanuele Castano. International Review of the Red Cross, 697-705.
49. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Judgment), ICJ Rep 253 (International Court of Justice 06 22, 1974).
50. Olsen, J., & March, J. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International Organizations Law Review, 943-949.
51. Pictet, J. (1952). Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. 1: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sıck in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva: ICRC.
52. Pictet, J. (1960). Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. 3: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva: ICRC.
53. Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a ‘Dule’, Opinion and Judgment Trial Chamber II, IT-94-1-T (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 07 14, 1997).
54. Radio Dabanga. (2017, 02 01). Darfur: Unamid Welcomes JEM Order Against Child Soldiers. https://www.dabangasudan.org: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-unamid-welcomes-jem-order-against-child-soldiers adresinden alındı
55. Relief Web. (2010, 07 21). Memorandum of Understanding between the JEM and the UN regarding Protection of Children. http://reliefweb.int: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3864EE07BF38473C852577670066EA08-Full_Report.pdf adresinden alındı
56. Roberts, A., & Sivakumaran, S. (2012). Lawmaking By Non-State Actors: Engaging Armed Groups In The Creation Of International Humanitarian Law. Yale Journal of International Law, 37.
57. Rodenhäuser, T. (2018). Organizing Rebellion: Non-State Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, And International Criminal Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
58. Rojas, D. M., & Frésard, J. J. (2004). The Roots of Behaviour in War. Geneva: IRRC.
59. Ryngaert, C. (2011). Non-State Actors In International Humanitarian Law. J. d'Aspremont içinde, Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non–State Actors in International Law (s. 289). London: Routledge.
60. Saab, B., & Taylor, A. (2009). Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 455-475.
61. Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C., & Zimmermann, B. (1987 ). Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
62. Sanín, F. (2008). Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War. Politics and Society , 3-34.
63. Sassòli, M. (2010). Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways To Improve Their Compliance With International Humanitarian Law. Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 3.
64. Schneckener, U., & Hofmann, C. (2015). The Power of Persuation - The role of international non-governmental organizations in engaging armed groups. H. Krieger içinde, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (s. 97). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
65. Shany, Y., & Sassòli, M. (2011). Debate: Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law Really be Equal? International Review of the Red Cross, 882.
66. Sinno, A. (2011). Armed Groups’ Organizational Structure and Their Strategic Options. International Review of the Red Cross, 317.
67. Sivakumaran, S. (2006). Binding Armed Opposition Groups. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 373.
68. Small Arms Survey. (2017). Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, Justice and Equality Movement. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
69. Tanner, V., & Tubiana, J. (2006). Interview with JEM Cadre. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
70. Tanner, V., & Tubiana, J. (2006). Interview with Zaghawa Traditional Leader. Am Nabak: Small Arms Survey.
71. Tanner, V., & Tubiana, J. (2007). Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
72. UN News Centre. (2016, 05 16). Colombia: agreement to reintegrate children from FARC welcomed by UN envoy. http://www.un.org/: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53948#.WYl9B8aB3EY adresinden alındı
73. UN Peacemaker. (2013, 02 10). Ceasefire Agreement. http://peacemaker.un.org: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_130210_CeasefireGoSJEMSudan.pdf adresinden alındı
74. UNSG. (2009). Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Geneva: United Nations Secretary-General.
75. UNSG. (2011). Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General. Geneva: UNSG.
76. Veuthey, M. (1983). Guérilla et Droit Humanitaire. Geneva: ICRC.
77. Waal, A. (2007). Darfur’s Deadline: the Final Days of the Abuja Peace Process. A. Waal içinde, War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (s. 275). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
78. Waal, A., & Flint, J. (2008). Darfur: A Short History of a Long War African Arguments. London: Zed Books.
79. Wilson, H. A. (1998). International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
80. Wood, R. (2015). Strategic Motives for Violence against Civilians. H. Krieger içinde, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (s. 41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
81. Zegveld, L. (2002). Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.