INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Abstract

The turmoil associated with the emergence of the New World Order is, to a large extent, the result of the interaction of at least three types of states which call themselves nations but share few of the historic attributes of the nation state. First, there are ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires e.g. the states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union . Historic grievances obsess them, they often adopt a policy of nation-state building ignoring the goal of international order and their foreign policies are highly volatile since they have no experience or diplomatic tradition to rely on. These states need to be socialised1 into the international system. Walt2 argues that states of this type are almost revolutionary, tending to wage wars against one another because the turmoil surrounding them alters the balance of power, this increases the danger of misperception and affects their calculations about how easy it is to win. Second, there are post-colonial states e.g. in the Middle East and Africa . These states are characterised by the traditions of tribalism and authoritarianism. However, the imperial powers imposed a new tradition upon them: the modern nation-state. In post-colonial states, political identities were traditionally drawn from one's religious affiliation or one's local kin group. However, the imperial powers took out their imperial pens and carved out an assortment of nation-states. In other words, most of the post-colonial states were not willed into existence by their own people; rather, the imperial powers imposed their shapes and structures and they have little or no historical precedent. When these new nation-states were created, in each one, a particular tribe-like group either seized power or the imperial powers ensconced them in power e.g. the Alawites in Syria, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, etc. . These modernising rulers tried to solidify and develop their relatively new nation-states, and, therefore, the state too often came to mean the army, which was usually the only national institution safeguarding domestic order

References

1. 1. The term is used in the spirit of K.N. Waltz, op. cit. (fn. 1), pp. 74-77 and 127-128.
2. 2. See S.M. Walt, 'Revolution and War', World Politics 3, 1992, pp. 321-368.
3. 3. See M. Webber, CIS Integration Trends, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
4. 4. See: J. Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988; S. Dalby, 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: the Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse', Alternatives, 17, 1992, pp. 95-134.
5. 5. The post-Cold War international system is one of multilevel interdependence. At the military level, the international system is unipolar since there is no other military power comparable to the United States. At the economic level, the international system is tripolar consisting of an Asian bloc formed around the yen, a Western Hemisphere bloc around the US dollar and a European bloc clustering around the ECU or the German mark. At the level of transnational interdependence, the international system shows a diffusion of power.
6. 7. See T. Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
7. 8 See: R.J. Martin, The Economy and Foreign Relations of Azerbaijan, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996; G. Bondarevsky and G. Englefield, Boundary Issues in Central Asia, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
8. 9. See P. Baev, Russian Policy in the Caucasus, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.

9. 10.See G. Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
10. 11. See H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 834.
11. 12. See H. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1979. p. 55.
12. 13. See J. Kirkpatrick, interview, U.S. News & World Report, 10 March 1986, p. 36. It is a mistake on behalf of the West (especially the EU) to adopt the view that modern societies are supposed to diffuse the values of the Western democracy in the developing countries without bearing in mind historical necessities. For instance, in the 1990s, the army is the most modernised authoritative agency in Turkey's transitional society. In Turkey, the army can provide a sense of citizenship, an appreciation of political action and can lead to a more responsible nationalism since it counters Islamic fundamentalism and aims at the modernisation of Turkey by introducing and consolidating Western economic, social and political institutions. In general, following Jeanne Kirkpatrick's 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', Commentary 68, 1979, pp. 34-45, we can argue that authoritarian regimes (on the right) that are allies of the West should be differentiated from and considered to be 'better' than totalitarian regimes (i.e. regimes based on left-wing ideologies or religious fundamentalism) mainly because authoritarian systems are putatively susceptible to incremental democratisation/modernisation-a disposition for which their enmity to communism/fundamentalism served as a predominant piece of evidence.
13. 14. See H. Kissinger, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 21.
14. 15. See R. Gates, interviewed by B. van Voorst, Time, 20 April 1992, pp. 39-40.
15. 16. See B. Schneider and L. Grinter (eds.), Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3, 1995.
16. 17. A characteristic example of bio-terrorism is the Aum Shinri Kyo sect attack on the Tokyo subway on 20 March 1995.
17. 18. See M. Rifkind, 'Diplomacy and the Spreading of Prosperity', Survey of Current Affairs 26, 1996, p. 232.
18. 19. See M. Rifkind, ibid., pp. 232-233.