Otizmde İkili Süreç Kuramı: Anlatımsal Bir Derleme

Öz

Otizmde İkili Süreç Kuramı, otistik bireylerin bilişsel işleme biçimlerini açıklamak için kullanılan çağdaş bir yaklaşımdır. Bu kuram, bireylerin sezgisel (Tip I; hızlı ve otomatik) ve muhakemeye dayalı (Tip II; yavaş ve analitik) olmak üzere iki farklı işlem biçimine başvurduğunu öne sürmektedir. Otistik bireylerin nörotipik akranlarına kıyasla sezgisel işleme daha az, muhakemeye dayalı işlemeye ise daha çok yöneldiği iddia edilmektedir. Bu bilişsel stil, çerçeveleme etkisi, batık maliyet yanlılığı ve birleşim yanılgısı gibi yaygın önyargılara karşı daha az duyarlılık göstermeleriyle ilişkilendirilmiştir. Bazı çalışmalar, otistik bireylerin mantıksal tutarlılıkta üstünlük sergilediğini ve daha az sezgisel yanıt verdiğini rapor ederken, diğerleri bu farklılıkları doğrulamamış veya çelişkili sonuçlar sunmuştur. Öz-bildirimler genellikle düşük sezgisel ve yüksek muhakemeci eğilimleri işaret etse de performansa dayalı ölçümlerle tutarsızlıklar dikkat çekmektedir. Ayrıca, kullanılan görevlerin ekolojik geçerliliği, örneklemlerin sınırlılığı ve bilişsel yetilerin yeterince kontrol edilmemesi, mevcut kanıtların yorumlanmasını zorlaştırmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, kuram otizmin sosyal olmayan alanlarda güçlü yönlerini ve sosyal bağlamlarda yaşanan zorlukları birlikte değerlendirmeye imkân tanımaktadır. Özellikle sosyal etkileşimlerde hızlı sezgisel işlem eksikliği, iletişim güçlüklerini artırabilirken, analitik düşünmeye dayalı yaklaşım yapılandırılmış ortamlarda avantaj sağlayabilmektedir. Sonuç olarak, Otizmde İkili Süreç Kuramı otistik bilişsel çeşitliliği anlamada değerli bir çerçeve sunmakta, ancak tutarsız ve sınırlı bulgular nedeniyle daha geniş, ekolojik geçerliliği yüksek araştırmalara ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu yaklaşım, hem kuramsal anlayışa hem de otizme yönelik destek stratejilerinin geliştirilmesine önemli katkılar sağlayabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Otizm Spektrum Bozukluğu
• İkili Süreç Kuramları
• Rasyonalite
• Bireysel Farklılıklar

The Dual Process Theory of Autism: A Narrative Review

Abstract

The Dual Process Theory in Autism is a contemporary approach used to explain the cognitive processing styles of autistic individuals. The theory proposes that individuals rely on two distinct modes of processing: intuitive (Type I; fast and automatic) and reasoning-based (Type II; slow and analytical). It is suggested that, compared to their neurotypical peers, autistic individuals tend to engage less in intuitive processing and more in reasoning-based processing. This cognitive style has been associated with reduced susceptibility to common biases such as the framing effect, sunk cost fallacy, and conjunction fallacy. Some studies report that autistic individuals demonstrate superiority in logical consistency and produce fewer intuitive responses, whereas others have failed to confirm these differences or have presented contradictory findings. Although self-reports often indicate lower intuitive and higher reasoning tendencies, inconsistencies emerge when compared with performance-based measures. Moreover, issues such as the ecological validity of the tasks employed, the limitations of the samples, and insufficient control of cognitive abilities make the interpretation of existing evidence difficult. Nevertheless, the theory provides a framework for jointly considering both the strengths of autism in non-social domains and the difficulties experienced in social contexts. In particular, the lack of rapid intuitive processing in social interactions may exacerbate communication difficulties, while an analytic approach may offer advantages in structured environments. In conclusion, the Dual Process Theory in Autism offers a valuable framework for understanding autistic cognitive diversity. However, due to inconsistent and limited findings, broader research with higher ecological validity is needed. This approach has the potential to contribute significantly both to theoretical understanding and to the development of support strategies for autism.

Keywords

• Autism Spectrum Disorder
• Dual-Process Theories
• Rationality
• Individual Differences

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