ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ РЕФОРМ НА БЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ

Year 2014, Issue: 62, 7 - 16, 01.05.2014

S. A. Avcu

Abstract

Keywords

экономические реформы, политические последствия, Ближний Восток

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

This article explores the political consequences of economic reforms, particularly the relationship between economic reforms, the behaviors of Islamic movements and implications for democratization. This study traces the twenty-year process from economic reforms caused by debt crisis during the 1980s to outcomes of violence or non-violence during the 1990s. Economic reforms change the interest structure of the society. If Islamic groups are included in the winning coalition need to carry out of reform, they often benefit from reforms. If Islamic groups are benefiting from reforms, they support liberal economic policies. If they are losing, they support statist policies that provide material benefits. Islamist movements radicalize when they face oppression if two conditions present. First, if the losers comprise the majority of Islamists, the radicals among them outweigh the moderates. Second, if Islamists are homogenous unprivileged groups in terms of their economic and social circumstances, they solve the collective action problem and turn violence. On the contrary, if they are diverse among the classes, ranging from bourgeoisie to workers, they cannot solve the collective action problems and stay moderate. I argue that Algerian Islamists fit the first category because they are mostly unemployed, educated urban youth, while Turkish Islamists can be found in all social classes including bourgeoisie. Therefore we get violence in Algeria but not in Turkey. I apply Mill’s method of agreement and method of difference to eliminate rival hypotheses and use process tracing to explain the stages of causal mechanism from debt crisis to the outcome of violence or non-violence

Keywords

Economic reforms, political consequences, Middle East, Islamic groups

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

This article explores the political consequences of economic reforms, particularly the relationship
between economic reforms, the behaviors of Islamic movements and implications for democratization.
This study traces the twenty-year process from economic reforms caused by debt crisis during the
1980s to outcomes of violence or non-violence during the 1990s. Economic reforms change the interest structure of the society. If Islamic groups are included in the winning coalition need to carry out of
reform, they often benefit from reforms. If Islamic groups are benefiting from reforms, they support
liberal economic policies. If they are losing, they support statist policies that provide material benefits.
Islamist movements radicalize when they face oppression if two conditions present. First, if the losers
comprise the majority of Islamists, the radicals among them outweigh the moderates. Second, if Islamists are homogenous unprivileged groups in terms of their economic and social circumstances, they
solve the collective action problem and turn violence. On the contrary, if they are diverse among the
classes, ranging from bourgeoisie to workers, they cannot solve the collective action problems and stay
moderate. I argue that Algerian Islamists fit the first category because they are mostly unemployed, educated urban youth, while Turkish Islamists can be found in all social classes including bourgeoisie.
Therefore we get violence in Algeria but not in Turkey. I apply Mill’s method of agreement and method
of difference to eliminate rival hypotheses and use process tracing to explain the stages of causal mechanism from debt crisis to the outcome of violence or non-violence

Keywords

Economic reforms, political consequences, Middle East

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