BAŞKANLIK SİSTEMİNDE YÜRÜTME ORGANININ GÜCÜ: ABD, ARJANTİN VE BREZİLYA

Year 2016, Volume: 4 Issue: 2, 54 - 73, 01.01.2016

İlknur Türe

Abstract

Başkanlık sistemi literatürüne bakıldığında başkanların ya en güçlü aktörler olarak ya da politik kararlar üzerinde daha fazla söz sahibi olmayı amaçlayan kişiler olarak sunulduğunu görürüz. Başkanın ve yürütme organının giderek daha kompleks hale gelmesine rağmen, yürütme organı özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerde adeta bir kara kutu gibi ele alınmaktadır. Araştırmacılar Latin Amerika ülkeleri başkanlık sistemini incelediklerinde ortaya çıkan siyasi sonuçların tek sorumlusunu -iyi ya da kötü, başarı ya da başarısızlık- başkan olarak ortaya koymaktadırlar. Bu çalışmada ABD ve bazı Latin Amerika ülkeleri- Arjantin ve Brezilyaarasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkları özellikle yürütme organı ve örgütü açısından incelenecek ve literatürdeki mevcut boşluğu kapatmaya az da olsa bir katkıda bulunabilmeye çalışılacaktır

Keywords

Başkan Yürütme Organı Kabine Bürokrasi Başkanlık Sistemi

POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM: USA, ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

Abstract

The presidential politics literature depicts presidents either as allpowerful actors or figureheads and seeks to explain outcomes accordingly. The president and the executive branch are nonetheless usually treated as black boxes, particularly in developing countries, even though the presidency has evolved into an extremely complex branch of government. Particularly in Latin America, where presidential systems have been considered the source of all goods and evils. To help close the knowledge gap and explore differences in policymaking characteristics not only between Latin America and the USA but also by two examples Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina this paper try to fill the gap as an organization and resources of the executive branch in the Latin America

Keywords

President Executive Branch Cabinet Civil Service Presidential System

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