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سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف

Year 2021, Volume: 10 Issue: 4, 49 - 64, 01.10.2021

Abstract

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تحليل سياسات ثلاث دول خليجية، هي: الإمارات وقطر والسعودية تجاه أفغانستان. وتجادل الدراسة بأن لدى كل من السعودية والإمارات تخوفات؛ أهمها التقارب بين طالبان وإيران، وموجات اللجوء المحتملة من أفغانستان. توصّلت الدراسة إلى أنّ احتمالية أن يمنح استيلاء طالبان على الحكم دفعة لحركات الإسلام السياسي تمثّل مصدر إزعاج لأبو ظبي، في حين تخشى الرياض من تهديد طالبان لأمن نظامها الداخلي، أو تحدّي مكانتها المميزة في العالم الإسلامي. أما عن قطر؛ فتجادل الدراسة بأنها اللاعب الخليجي الأكثر فعالية على الساحة الأفغانية؛ بفضل دور الوساطة الذي تؤدّيه بين الولايات المتحدة وطالبان منذ عام 2013. وعلى الرغم من اختلاف تخوفات كل لاعب، إلا أن القاسم المشترك بين اللاعبين الثلاثة هو اتباعهم سياسة براغماتية حذرة، بحيث يسعى كل لاعب إلى عدم ترك المجال فارغًا لمنافسيه، وفي الوقت نفسه لا يتسرع في إقامة علاقات قوية مع طالبان.

References

  • Samuel Ramani, “A New Afghanistan: How Regional Powers are Preparing for Taliban Rule”, The New Arab, 23 August 2021.
  • Giorgio Cafiero, “China and Russia’s Influence over Afghanistan’s Islamic Emirate”, The New Arab, 25 August 2021.
  • Kabir Taneja, “Saudi Arabia and UAE: Are They Strategically Distancing Themselves from the Afghanistan Crisis?”, Orfonline, 20 July 2021.
  • Greg Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan”, Council Foreign Relations, 10 December 2008.
  • Mehmet Rakipoğlu, “Afganistan Denkleminde Körfez’in Zor Dansı”, Fikir Turu, 25 August 2021.
  • Cathrin Schaer, “Saudi Arabia and Taliban Unlikely to Revive Old Alliances”, DW, 28 August 2021.
  • كان البشتون الوهابيون يشكّلون الكادر الأساسي لطالبان، ولكن هذه المجموعة انفصلت عن قيادة الحركة في المرحلة التي تلت سقوط نجيب الله. ومن هنا انتهى التقارب الأيديولوجي بين السعودية وطالبان. في الوقت نفسه عانى حكمتيار ورسول سياف العديد من المشكلات، وهذا أدى إلى تضاؤل النفوذ السعودي في أفغانستان. انظر: Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan”.
  • Guido Steinberg ve Nils Woermer, “Exploring Iran & Saudi Arabia’s Interests in Afghanistan&Pakistan: Stakeholders or - A Zero Sum Aame? Part 1: Saudi Arabia”, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, CIDOB Policy Research Project Paper, (April 2013).
  • Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan”; Umer Karim, “The Gulf Prepares for an Afghan Scramble”, Gulf International Forum, 2 September 2021.
  • Giorgio Cafiero, “Gulf States React Cautiously to the Taliban 2.0”, Responsible Statecraft, 27 August 2021.
  • Bilal Y. Saab, “In Afghanistan, the Gulf Arab States Stepped up”, Middle East Institute, 1 September 2021.
  • David B. Roberts, “Qatar, the Taliban, and the Gulf Schism”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 19 October 2020.
  • Umer Karim, “Gulf Engagement in Afghanistan’s Evolving Political Marketplace: Uneven Investment, Uncertain Prospects”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 9 July 2021.
  • Neil Quilliam, “Implications of the Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan for Saudi Arabia”, The Fall of Kabul: Geopolitical Implications, A Wikistrat Special Report, 20 August 2021, s. 24.
  • James M. Dorsey, “Hedging Saudi Bets: Iran Looms, Israel Beckons, and Taliban Cause Goosebumps”, Responsible Statecraft, 27 August 2021.
  • Saab, “In Afghanistan, the Gulf Arab States Stepped up”.
  • Ramani, “A New Afghanistan: How Regional Powers are Preparing for Taliban Rule”.
  • Maysam Behravesh, “What does Iran want in Afghanistan?”, Aljazeera, 4 February 2019.
  • Maryam Sinaiee, “Taliban in Tehran For Talks, While Biden Team eviews US Afghan Policy”, Iran International, 26 January 2021, https:// iranintl.com/en/world/taliban-tehran-talks-while-biden-team-reviewsus-afghan-policy.
  • Mehmet Rakipoğlu, “BAE İnsani Yardımlarla Salgını Fırsata Çevirme Uğraşında”, Anadolu Ajansı, 30 April 2020.
  • İsmail Numan Telci, “BAE ve Katar’ın Afganistan’da Diplomasi Hamlesi”, Sabah Perspektif, 28 August 2021.
  • Mustafa Fetouri, “After Afghanistan, US Allies Must Feel a Sense of Abandonment”, Middle East Monitor, 2 September 2021.
  • Joshua D. Kertzer, “American Credibility after Afghanistan What the Withdrawal Really Means for Washington’s Reputation”, Foreign Affairs, 2 September 2021.
  • Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The Intensifying Uncertainty Over the Future of US Engagement in the Region”, The Fall of Kabul: Geopolitical Implications, A Wikistrat Special Report, 20 August 2021, s. 25.
  • Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, “Lessons from Afghanistan for the Gulf ”, The National, 17 August 2021.
  • Robert Mason, “Saudi-Russian Military Cooperation: Signaling or Strategy?”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 3 Eylül 2021.
  • Robert Mason, “Saudi-Russian Military Cooperation: Signaling or Strategy?”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 3 Eylül 2021.
  • Imad K. Harb, “After Afghanistan, a New Biden Middle East Doctrine Takes Shape”, Arab Center Washington DC, 19 August 2021.
  • Dorsey, “Hedging Saudi Bets: Iran Looms, Israel Beckons, and Taliban Cause Goosebumps”.
  • Khalid Jaber, “How will the Middle East Greet the Afghan Taliban?”, The National Interest, 31 August 2021.

Gulf Policies toward Afghanistan: Cautious Pragmatism between Opportunities and Fears

Year 2021, Volume: 10 Issue: 4, 49 - 64, 01.10.2021

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the policies of three Gulf states towards Afghanistan, namely the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The study argues that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fears, the most important of which are the rapprochement between the Taliban and Iran, and possible waves of Afghan refugees. The study found that the possibility that the Taliban's takeover of power would give
a boost to political Islam movements is a source of inconvenience for Abu Dhabi, while Riyadh fears that the Taliban will threaten the security of its internal regime or challenge its privileged position in the Islamic world. As for Qatar, the study argues that it is the most effective Gulf actor in Afghanistan, thanks to the mediating role it has played between the United States and the Taliban since 2013. Despite the different fears of each player, the common denominator among the three players is that they follow a cautious pragmatic policy, so that each player is not in a hurry to establish strong relations with the Taliban.

References

  • Samuel Ramani, “A New Afghanistan: How Regional Powers are Preparing for Taliban Rule”, The New Arab, 23 August 2021.
  • Giorgio Cafiero, “China and Russia’s Influence over Afghanistan’s Islamic Emirate”, The New Arab, 25 August 2021.
  • Kabir Taneja, “Saudi Arabia and UAE: Are They Strategically Distancing Themselves from the Afghanistan Crisis?”, Orfonline, 20 July 2021.
  • Greg Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan”, Council Foreign Relations, 10 December 2008.
  • Mehmet Rakipoğlu, “Afganistan Denkleminde Körfez’in Zor Dansı”, Fikir Turu, 25 August 2021.
  • Cathrin Schaer, “Saudi Arabia and Taliban Unlikely to Revive Old Alliances”, DW, 28 August 2021.
  • كان البشتون الوهابيون يشكّلون الكادر الأساسي لطالبان، ولكن هذه المجموعة انفصلت عن قيادة الحركة في المرحلة التي تلت سقوط نجيب الله. ومن هنا انتهى التقارب الأيديولوجي بين السعودية وطالبان. في الوقت نفسه عانى حكمتيار ورسول سياف العديد من المشكلات، وهذا أدى إلى تضاؤل النفوذ السعودي في أفغانستان. انظر: Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan”.
  • Guido Steinberg ve Nils Woermer, “Exploring Iran & Saudi Arabia’s Interests in Afghanistan&Pakistan: Stakeholders or - A Zero Sum Aame? Part 1: Saudi Arabia”, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, CIDOB Policy Research Project Paper, (April 2013).
  • Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan”; Umer Karim, “The Gulf Prepares for an Afghan Scramble”, Gulf International Forum, 2 September 2021.
  • Giorgio Cafiero, “Gulf States React Cautiously to the Taliban 2.0”, Responsible Statecraft, 27 August 2021.
  • Bilal Y. Saab, “In Afghanistan, the Gulf Arab States Stepped up”, Middle East Institute, 1 September 2021.
  • David B. Roberts, “Qatar, the Taliban, and the Gulf Schism”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 19 October 2020.
  • Umer Karim, “Gulf Engagement in Afghanistan’s Evolving Political Marketplace: Uneven Investment, Uncertain Prospects”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 9 July 2021.
  • Neil Quilliam, “Implications of the Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan for Saudi Arabia”, The Fall of Kabul: Geopolitical Implications, A Wikistrat Special Report, 20 August 2021, s. 24.
  • James M. Dorsey, “Hedging Saudi Bets: Iran Looms, Israel Beckons, and Taliban Cause Goosebumps”, Responsible Statecraft, 27 August 2021.
  • Saab, “In Afghanistan, the Gulf Arab States Stepped up”.
  • Ramani, “A New Afghanistan: How Regional Powers are Preparing for Taliban Rule”.
  • Maysam Behravesh, “What does Iran want in Afghanistan?”, Aljazeera, 4 February 2019.
  • Maryam Sinaiee, “Taliban in Tehran For Talks, While Biden Team eviews US Afghan Policy”, Iran International, 26 January 2021, https:// iranintl.com/en/world/taliban-tehran-talks-while-biden-team-reviewsus-afghan-policy.
  • Mehmet Rakipoğlu, “BAE İnsani Yardımlarla Salgını Fırsata Çevirme Uğraşında”, Anadolu Ajansı, 30 April 2020.
  • İsmail Numan Telci, “BAE ve Katar’ın Afganistan’da Diplomasi Hamlesi”, Sabah Perspektif, 28 August 2021.
  • Mustafa Fetouri, “After Afghanistan, US Allies Must Feel a Sense of Abandonment”, Middle East Monitor, 2 September 2021.
  • Joshua D. Kertzer, “American Credibility after Afghanistan What the Withdrawal Really Means for Washington’s Reputation”, Foreign Affairs, 2 September 2021.
  • Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The Intensifying Uncertainty Over the Future of US Engagement in the Region”, The Fall of Kabul: Geopolitical Implications, A Wikistrat Special Report, 20 August 2021, s. 25.
  • Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, “Lessons from Afghanistan for the Gulf ”, The National, 17 August 2021.
  • Robert Mason, “Saudi-Russian Military Cooperation: Signaling or Strategy?”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 3 Eylül 2021.
  • Robert Mason, “Saudi-Russian Military Cooperation: Signaling or Strategy?”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 3 Eylül 2021.
  • Imad K. Harb, “After Afghanistan, a New Biden Middle East Doctrine Takes Shape”, Arab Center Washington DC, 19 August 2021.
  • Dorsey, “Hedging Saudi Bets: Iran Looms, Israel Beckons, and Taliban Cause Goosebumps”.
  • Khalid Jaber, “How will the Middle East Greet the Afghan Taliban?”, The National Interest, 31 August 2021.
There are 30 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Arabic
Subjects Regional Studies, Middle East Studies, Politics in International Relations
Journal Section Research Articles
Authors

Mehmet Rakipoğlu 0000-0002-6287-6943

Publication Date October 1, 2021
Published in Issue Year 2021 Volume: 10 Issue: 4

Cite

APA Rakipoğlu, M. (2021). سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف. Rouya Türkiyyah, 10(4), 49-64.
AMA Rakipoğlu M. سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف. Rouya Türkiyyah. October 2021;10(4):49-64.
Chicago Rakipoğlu, Mehmet. “سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف”. Rouya Türkiyyah 10, no. 4 (October 2021): 49-64.
EndNote Rakipoğlu M (October 1, 2021) سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف. Rouya Türkiyyah 10 4 49–64.
IEEE M. Rakipoğlu, “سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف”, Rouya Türkiyyah, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 49–64, 2021.
ISNAD Rakipoğlu, Mehmet. “سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف”. Rouya Türkiyyah 10/4 (October 2021), 49-64.
JAMA Rakipoğlu M. سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف. Rouya Türkiyyah. 2021;10:49–64.
MLA Rakipoğlu, Mehmet. “سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف”. Rouya Türkiyyah, vol. 10, no. 4, 2021, pp. 49-64.
Vancouver Rakipoğlu M. سياسة الخليج تجاه أفغانستان: البراغماتية الحذرة بين الفرص والمخاوف. Rouya Türkiyyah. 2021;10(4):49-64.