Avrupa Birliği Sayıştayının Kurumsal Etkinliği

Year 2010, Issue: 77, 3 - 32, 01.06.2010

Özgür Mengiler

Abstract

Mali denetim, uluslararası örgütlerin yetkilerini kullanırken yasal gerekçelere dayanmalarını ve kaynaklarını verimli kullanmalarını öngören hesap verebilirlik ilkesinin önemli bir bileşenini oluşturmaktadır. Üye devletlerce gerçekleştirilen yetki devrinin, diğer uluslararası örgütlerdekine kıyasla, çok daha kapsamlı olduğu Avrupa Birliği’nde, mali denetim işlevini yerine getiren Avrupa Birliği Sayıştayı’nın ABS etkinliğinin araştırılması özellikle önemli görülmektedir. Uluslararası organların kurumsal etkinliğinin araştırılmasında kullanılan bağımsızlık, yetki kapsamı ve kurumsal konum ölçütleri bağlamında yapılan değerlendirme sonucunda, ABS’nın görece etkin çalıştığı gözlenmiştir. İlk olarak, ABS; hem denetlediği yürütme erkinden hem de adına denetim yaptığı yasama erkinden gelebilecek etkilerden uzak kalarak, bağımsızlık koşulunu kurumsal düzeyde, üyeleri düzeyinde ve mali kaynaklarının yönetimi bağlamında yerine getirmektedir. İkinci olarak, ABS’nın yetkisi, yargısal işlev görmemesi nedeniyle sınırlamalar içerse de, raporlarındaki geleceğe yönelik uyarılar, ABS’nın usulsüzlük önleyici rol oynamasını sağlamaktadır. Denetim yetkisi bağlamında, bağlayıcılığı olan karar alamaması ve saptadığı usulsüzlük karşısında yaptırım öngörememesinden; rapor sunma yetkisi bulunmamasından kaynaklanan sınırlamalar, Birlik organlarının mali işlemlerdeki performansına ilişkin güvence bildiriminde bulunmayı reddetme hakkında somutlaşan siyasi yaptırım gücüyle aşılmıştır

Keywords

Avrupa Birliği Sayıştayı, hesap verebilirlik, mali denetim, Avrupa Parlamentosu, parlamenter denetim

THE INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

Abstract

Financial audit forms an essential component of accountability of international organizations, since they have to justify their actions on legal grounds and use their resources efficiently. Exploring the effectiveness of the European Court of Auditors ECA is of particular significance, as, in the case of the European Union, the power conferral by the member states is far more comprehensive. As a result of this examination, which is based on three factors that are used in order to determine the effectiveness of international organs –namely, independence, discretion and institutional position- it is concluded that the ECA functions relatively effective. Firstly, the ECA passes the test of independence on all three levels –institutional, personal and financial- by staying away from possible initiatives of influence arising from the executive and the legislative organs. Secondly,despite of the limitation imposed on its discretion due to the organ’s lack of judicial power,the ECA has a preventive role in precluding irregularities through publishing reports. The restriction brought about by the absence of discretion to take binding decisions and to sanction the perpetrators of financial offences is compensated for by the ECA’s political influence. Thirdly, the ECA’s institutional position demonstrates that both parliamentary control and accountability in the Union are enhanced through the ECA’s cooperation with the European Parliament.The ECA also helps improve the Council’s work on financial matters as well as the Commission’s implementation of the budget

Keywords

European Court of Auditors, accountability, financial audit, European Parliament, parliamentary control

References

• Acemoglu, D. ve T. Verdier (1998), “Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach”, Economic Journal, Vol. 108, No. 450, 1381-1403.
• Akıllıoğlu, Tekin ve A. Şeref Gözübüyük (1992), Yönetim Hukuku, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara.
• Von Arnim, Hans-Herbert ve Martin Schurig (2004), The European Party Financing Regulation, LIT Verlag, Münster.
• Bauer, Michael W. (2001), A Creeping Transformation?: The European Commission and the Management of EU Structural Funds in Germany, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
• Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise (2003), “Auditing and Evaluating Collaborative Government: The Role of Supreme Audit Institutions”, Collaboration in Public Services: The Challenge for Evaluation, Andrew Gray vd. (der.), Transaction Publishers, New Jersey.
• Bergman, Torbjörn ve Tapio Raunio (2001), “Parliaments and Policy-making in the European Union”, European Union: Power and Policy-making, Jeremy John Richardson (der.), Routledge, London/New York.
• Blume, Lorenz ve Stefan Voigt (2007), “Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous? A Cross Country Assessment”, ICER Working Paper No.3/2007.
• Bovens, Mark (2005), “From Financial Accounting to Public Accountability”, Bestandsaufnahme Finanzmanagements, H.Hill (der.), Nomos Verlag, Baden Baden. und Perspektiven des Haushalts-und
• Bovens, Mark (2007), “New Forms of Accountability and EU- Governance”, Comparative European Politics, Cilt 5.
• Bovens, Mark, Deirdre Curtin, Paul T. Hart (2002), The Real World of EU Accountability: What Deficit?, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York.
• Christiansen, Thomas (2006), “The Council of Ministers: Facilitating Interaction and Developing Actorness in the EU”, European Union Power and Policy-making, Jeremy Richardson (der.), Routledge, London/ New York.
• Clark, Colin, Michael D. Martinis, Maria Kambia- Kopardis (2007), “Audit Quality Attributes of European Supreme Audit Institutions”, European Business Review, Cilt 19, Sayı 1.
• Coffey, Peter (2003), The Future of Europe Revisited, Edward Elgar Publishing, London.
• Corneroli, Gerardo (2001), “The Role of the European Court of Auditors in the Control of State Aid”, European Competition Law Annual 1999, Claus Dieter Ehlermann ve Michelle Everson (der.), Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland.
• Court of Justice of the European Union (2002), “Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs concerning Case C-11/00 Commission of the European Communities v. European Central Bank’, http://curia.europa.eu/ jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&alljur=alljur&jurcdj=jurcdj&jurtpi= jurtpi&jurtfp=jurtfp &numaff= c-11/00 (Erişim Tarihi: 12.07.2010).
• Craig, Paul P. ve Grainne De Burca (2008), EU Law: Text, Cases, Materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York.
• Curtin, Deirdre (2007), “Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account”, European Law Journal, Cilt 13, Sayı 4.
• Davies, Karen (2003), Understanding European Law, Routledge, London/New York.
• Dye, Kenneth M. ve Rick Stapenhurst (1998), Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption, The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, Washington D.C.
• Eiselt, Isabella ve Peter Slominski (2006), “Sub-Constitutional Engineering: Negotiation, Content, and Legal Value of Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU”, European Law Journal, Cilt 12, Sayı 2.
• Enderlein, Henrik ve Johannes Lindner (2006), “The EU Budgetary Procedure in the Constitutional Debate’, European Union: Power and Policy- making, Jeremy Richadson (der.), Routledge,London/New York.
• European Court of Auditors (1999), “Annual Report concerning the Financial Year docs/1/134171.PDF (Erişim Tarihi: 12.07.2010).
• http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/
• European Court of Auditors (2001), ”Special Report on the Management of Common Foreign and Security Policy”, http://eca.europa.eu/ portal/pls/portal/docs/1/172997.PDF (ErişimTarihi: 12.07.2010).
• European Court of Auditors (2004), “Opinion on the ‘Single Audit’ Model”, http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/133046. PDF (Erişim Tarihi: 12.07.2010).
• European Court of Auditors (2006), “Special Report concerning the Environ- mental Aspects of the Commission’s Development Cooperation”, http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/173653. PDF (Erişim Tarihi: 12.07.2010).
• European Court of Auditors (2010), “Opinion on Improving the Financial Management of the European Union Budget: Risks and Challenges”, http: //eca.eurapa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/4030745.PDF (Erişim Tarihi: 12.07.2010).
• Van Gerven, Walter (2005), The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
• Gözübüyük, A. Şeref (1991), Yönetim Hukuku, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara.
• Grant, Wyn (1995), “The Limits of Common Agricultural Policy Reform and the Option of Denationalization”, Journal of European Public Policy, Cilt 2, Sayı 1.
• Harlow, Carol (2002), Accountability in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York.
• Held, David ve Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (2005), “Introduction”, Global Governance and Public Accountability, David Held ve Mathias Koenig- Archibugi (der.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
• House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2006), Nineteenth Report of Session 2005-06, House of Commons, London.
• Jones, Robert A. (2001), The Politics and Economics of the European Union, Edward Elgar Publishing, London.
• Laffan, Brigid (1999), “Becoming a ‘Living Institution’: The Evolution of the European Court of Auditors”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Cilt 37, Sayı 2.
• Laffan, Brigid (2002), “The Court of Auditors”, Understanding European Institutions, Alex Warleigh (der.), Routledge, London/New York.
• Laffan, Brigid (2003), “Auditing and Accountability in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, Cilt 10, Sayı 5.
• Laffan, Brigid (2006), “Financial Control: The Court of Auditors and OLAF”, The Institutions of the European Union, John Peterson ve Michael Shackleton (der.), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York.
• Laudati, Laraine (2002), “OLAF vs. DG Competition: A Comparison of the Community’s Anti-fraud System with its Competition System”, European Integration and International Coordination, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann vd. (der.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague.
• Levy, Roger (2000), Implementing European Union Public Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, Bath.
• Macmullen, Andrew (1999), “Political Responsibility for the Administration of Europe: The Commission’s Resignation of March 1999”, Parliamentary Affairs, Cilt 52, Sayı 4.
• Magnette, Paul (2001), “Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The Adaptation of Parliamentary Institutions to the Community Context”, European Law Journal, Cilt 7, Sayı 3.
• McDonald, Maryon (2000), “Accountability, Anthropology and the European Commission”, Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy, Marilyn Strathern (der.), Routledge, London/ New York.
• Anthropological Studies in
• Meuwesse, Anne C.M. (2008), Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn.
• Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
• O, Keeffe, David (1994), “The Court of Auditors”, Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, Deirdre Curtin, Ton Heukels, Henry G. Schermers Dordrecht/Boston/London. (der.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
• Van Oudenaren, John (2005), Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford.
• Power, Michael (2005), “The Theory of Audit Explosion”, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn, Christopher Pollitt (der.), Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York.
• Schermers, Henry G. ve Niels Blokker (2003), International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston/Leiden.
• Schwartz, Robert (2003), “Breaches of Integrity and Accountability Institutions: Auditors, Anti- Corruption Agencies and Commissions of Inquiry”, Paper Presented at the First Meeting of the Study Group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance, Annual Conference of the European Group of Public Administration, Portugal.
• Scott, Colin (2003), “Organizational Variety in Regulatory Governance: An Agenda for a Comparative Investigation of OECD Countries”, Public Organization Review, Cilt 3, Sayı 3.
• Skiadas, Dimitrios V. (2005), “Judicial, Controlling, and Advisory Institutions of the European Union”, Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union, M.P. van der Hoek (der.), CRC Press, Florida.
• Stasinopoulou, Katia (2006), “The European Parliament’s Role in the Resignation of the Santer Commission”, The Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption, Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston, Riccardo Pelizzo (der.), World Bank Publications, Washington D.C.
• Tillotson, John ve Nigel G.Foster (2003), European Union Law, Routledge, London/New York.
• Vaubel, Roland (2006), “Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations”, Review of International Organizations, Cilt 1, Sayı 1.
• Wang, Vibeke ve Lise Rakner (2005), “The Accountability Function of Supreme Audit Institutions in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania”, CMI Reports, Bergen.
• De Wet, Erika (2008), “Holding International Institutions Accountable: The Complementary Role of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review”, German Law Journal, Cilt 9, Sayı 11.
• White, Fidelma ve Kathryn Hollingsworth (1999), Audit, Accountability and Government, Clarendon Press, Oxford/ New York.
• WTO (2008), Dispute Settlement Reports (2006), C. IX, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/ New York.