INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: PANEL DATA ANALYSIS (2002-2018)

Öz

Today, economic growth and the factors of economic growth are one of the important topics of discussion topics. In this context, there is an increasing emphasis on the role of institutions in explaining the economic growth of countries. However, there is no consensus on which institutions and governance indicators are more important. The aim of this study is to examine empirically the effects of institutions on economic growth in all income group countries. In this study, the data obtained from World Bank World-wide Governance Indicators for the 23 less developed, 63 developing and 48 developed countries are examined in the 2002-2018 period and analysed two-stage system generalized moments method. Empirical results show that institutions are important for economic growth of countries. Among the institutional quality indicators, regulatory quality appears to be the most important factor for explaining the increase in GDP per capita in all countries. In addition, government effectiveness is very important for economic growth. While the indicators of voice and accountability, rule of law and the control of corruption affect economic growth positively and significantly, the effects of coefficients are low compared to other indicators. Political stability and However, it is important to note that only the quality of institutions cannot be sufficient for economic growth. The study reveals that structural factors such as government expenditures, gross capital accumulation, population growth rate, inflation and liberalization of trade have an important impact on economic growth. The findings of the study show that institutions are important in economic growth. Therefore, for a stable and permanent growth, countries should give priority to institutional strengthening policies.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Institutions
• Governance
• Economic Growth
• GMM Method

KURUMLAR VE EKONOMİK BÜYÜME: PANEL VERİ ANALİZİ (2002-2018)

Öz

Öz Günümüzde ekonomik büyüme ve ekonomik büyümeyi etkileyen faktörler, önemli tartışma konularından biridir. Bu bağlamda kurumların, ülkelerin ekonomik büyümesini açıklamadaki rolüne giderek artan bir vurgu vardır. Ancak, hangi kurum ve yönetişim göstergelerinin daha önemli olduğuna dair bir görüş birliğine varılamamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, tüm gelir grubundaki ülkelerde kurumların ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkilerini ampirik olarak incelemektir. Bu çalışmada, Dünya Bankası Dünya Çapında Yönetişim Göstergelerinden elde edilen veriler ile 2002-2018 dönemi için 23 azgelişmiş, 63 gelişmekte olan ve 48 gelişmiş ülke örneği ele alınmış ve iki aşamalı sistem genelleştirilmiş momentler yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Ampirik sonuçlar, kurumların ülkelerin ekonomik büyümesi için önemli olduğunu göstermektedir. Kurumsal göstergeler arasında, idari kaliteyi ülkelerdeki kişi başı GSYH artışının açıklanmasında en önemli faktör olarak yorumlamak mümkündür. Bunun yanında hükümetin etkinliği de ekonomik büyüme için oldukça önemlidir. Hukukun üstünlüğü, ifade özgürlüğü ve hesap verebilirlik ile yolsuzluğun kontrolü ise ekonomik büyümeyi pozitif ve anlamlı bir şekilde etkilerken, diğer göstergelere göre etkileme katsayıları düşüktür. Siyasi istikrar ve şiddetsizlik ise beklenenin aksine ülkelerde ekonomik büyümeyi oldukça az bir şekilde etkilemektedir. Ancak, ekonomik büyüme için yalnızca kurumların kalitesinin yeterli olamayacağına dikkat etmek gerekmektedir. Çalışma kurumlarla birlikte, hükümet harcamaları, gayri safi sermaye birikimi, nüfus artış hızı, enflasyon ve ticaretin serbestleşmesi gibi yapısal faktörlerin de ülkelerin ekonomik büyümesinde önemli bir etkisi olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları kurumların ekonomik büyümede önemli olduğunu göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla istikrarlı ve kalıcı bir büyüme için ülkelerin kurumları güçlendirici politikalara öncelik vermesi gerekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kurumlar
• Yönetişim
• Ekonomik Büyüme
• GMM Yöntemi

Kaynakça

1. Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1231-1294.
2. Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-1401.
3. Acemoğlu, D. & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling Institutions, Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), 949-995.
4. Acemoğlu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2015). Ulusların Düşüşü, Güç, Zenginlik ve Yoksulluğun Kökenleri, (Çev. Faruk Rasim Velioğlu), İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.
5. Ades, A. & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, Competition, and Corruption, The American Economic Review, 89(4), 982-993.
6. Alonso-Borrego, C. & Arellano M. (1999). Symmetrically Normalized Instrumental-variable Estimation Using Panel Data, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 17(1), 36-49.
7. Amsden, A. H. (1992). Asia’s next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277-297.

9. Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
10. Autio, E. & Fu, K. (2015). Economic and Political Institutions and Entry into Formal and Informal Entrepreneurship, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 32(1), 67-94.
11. Barro, R. J. & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Convergence, Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 223–251.
12. Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998). “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
13. Bond, S., Hoeffler, A. & Temple, J. (2001). GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models, CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 3048.
14. Campos, N. F. & Nugent, J. B. (1999). Development Performance and the Institutions of Governance: Evidence from East Asia and Latin America, World Development, 27(3), 439-452.
15. Chang, H. (2007). Understanding the Relationship between Institutions and Economic Development Some Key Theoretical Issues, Ha-Joon Chang (Ed.), Institutional Change and Economic Development, içinde (17-37), Londra: United Nations University Press.
16. Chansukree, P. (2012). The Impact of Politico-Economic Institutions on Economic Performance: Evidence from East Asia and Latin America, 1990-2009, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Thailand National Institute of Development Administration.
17. Coase, R. H. (1937). the Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
18. Coase, R. H. (1960). the Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.
19. De Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third, World, New York: Harper and Row.
20. De Soto, H. (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New York: Basic Books.
21. Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, Germs, and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies, New York: WW Norton & Company.
22. Fadakinte, M. (2013). Civil Society, Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria: 1999-2012, International Journal of Modern Social Sciences, 2(2), 133-154.
23. Feng, Y. (2005). Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
24. Ftoreková, M. & Mádr, M. (2017). The Rule of Law and Economic Growth in the Balkan States, European Journal of Business Science and Technology, 3(1), 13-20.
25. Gómez, M. (2008). Convergence Speed in the AK Endogenous Growth Model with Habit Formation, Economics Letters, 100(1), 16-21.
26. Hall, R. & Jones, C. (1999). Why do some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83-116.
27. Hansen, L. P. (2008). Generalized Method of Moments Estimation, the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, içinde (2428-2435), Chicago: Palgrave Press.
28. Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1029-1054.
29. Hayek, F. (1945). The Price System as a Mechanism for Using Knowledge, American Economic Review, 35(4), 519-30.
30. Khan, M. (2009). Is “Good Governance” an Appropriate Model for Governance Reforms? The Relevance of East Asia for Developing Muslim Countries, Development Models in Muslim Contexts; Chinese, ‘Islamic’and Neo-Liberal Alternatives, içinde (195-230), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
31. Khan, M. (2012). Governance and Growth: History, Ideology and Methods of Proof, Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies, içinde (51-79), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32. King, R. G. & Rebelo, S. (1990). Public Policy and Economic Growth: Developing Neoclassical Implications, Journal of Political Economy, 98(5:2), 126-S150.
33. Knowles, S. & Weatherston, C. (2006). Informal Institutions and Cross-Country Income Differences, Credit Research Paper, No. 06/06.
34. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1999). The Quality of Government, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 222-279.
35. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C. & Shleifer, A. (2004). Judicial Checks and Balances, Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 445–470.
36. Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22(1), 3-42.
37. Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D. & Weil, D. N. (1992). a Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(5), 407-437.
38. North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Omoteso, K. & Mobolaji, H. I. (2014). Corruption, Governance and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: a Need for the Prioritisation of Reform Policies, Social Responsibility Journal, 10(2), 316-330.
40. Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
41. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions Rule: the Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2), 131-165.
42. Rodrik, D. & Subramanian, A. (2003). The Primacy of Institutions, Finance and Development, 40(2), 31-34.
43. Roland, G. (2005). Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions, Nanjing Business Review, 2, 1-34.
44. Romer, P. (1987). Growth Based on Increasing Returns due to Specialization, The American Economic Review, 77(2), 56-62.
45. Ronconi, L. (2012). Globalization, Domestic Institutions and Enforcement of Labor Law: Evidence from Latin America, Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 51(1), 89-105.
46. Roodman, D. (2009). How to do xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata, The Stata Journal, 9(1), 86-136.
47. Rosenberg, N. (1994). Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
48. Sachs, J. (2003). Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income, National Bureau of Economic Research, (No. w9490).
49. Sargan, J. D. (1958). The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental Variables, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 26, 393-415.
50. Williamson, O. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press.
51. Williamson, O. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595–613.