Yolsuzluğun Kamu Hizmeti Fiyatları Üzerindeki Etkisi: Elektrik Piyasaları için Teorik ve Ampirik Bir İnceleme

Year 2024, , 73 - 93, 28.04.2024

Mustafa Kadir Doğan , Funda Altun

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.04

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, yolsuzluğun kamu hizmeti fiyatları üzerindeki etkisi araştırılmıştır. Öncelikle, oluşturulan oyun-teorisi modeliyle, görevdeki politikacı, firmalardan oluşan lobi grubu ve temsili tüketicinin kamu hizmeti fiyatının belirlenmesi sürecindeki etkileşimi analiz edilmiştir. Model, yolsuzluğun artması ile kamu hizmeti fiyatlarının yükseldiğine işaret etmektedir. Bu öngörü, 21 OECD ülkesinin 1995-2015 dönemine ait elektrik piyasası verileriyle ampirik olarak test edilmiş ve doğrulanmıştır. Ayrıca, seçilmiş reform değişkenlerinin elektrik fiyatları üzerindeki etkileri de incelenmiştir. Bazı reformların fiyatları düşürdüğü, bazılarının ise fiyat artışlarına katkıda bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bu bulgular, kamu hizmeti fiyatlarının doğru bir biçimde oluşumu için yolsuzlukla mücadelenin önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Keywords

Düzenleyiciyi Ele Geçirme, Yolsuzluk, Vekalet Teorisi, Kamusal Hizmet Fiyatları, Elektrik Fiyatları, Düzenleyici Reformlar

Impact of Corruption on Utility Prices: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis for the Electricity Markets

Abstract

This study investigates the influence of corruption on utility prices. We develop a game-theoretical model to explore the interactions between the government, an interest group formed by firms, and consumers in determining utility prices. The model suggests that an increase in corruption correlates with a rise in utility prices, a relationship confirmed through empirical analysis of electricity sectors in 21 OECD countries from 1995 to 2015. Additionally, we explore the effects of regulatory reforms on electricity prices, revealing mixed outcomes. The findings emphasise the importance of anti-corruption efforts in shaping fair utility prices.

Keywords

Regulatory Capture, Corruption, Political Agency, Utility Prices, Electricity Prices, Regulatory Reforms

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