Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı ve Makroekonomik Performans: TCMB Örneği

Year 2011, Volume: 16 Issue: 16, - , 01.12.2011

Hakan Demirgil

Abstract

Bu çalışma, Türkiye örneğinde, başta enflasyon oranları olmak üzere, makroekonomik performans ve merkez bankası bağımsızlığına ilişkin temel teorik çerçeveye ve deneysel sonuçlara ilişkin bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Çalışmada, 1980–2009 yılları arasında, makroekonomik performans ve enflasyon oranları açısından merkez bankası bağımsızlığının önemi incelenmiştir. Yasal bağımsızlık düzeyi ve Merkez Bankası başkanlarının devir hızı değişkenlerini kullanarak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası’nın bağımsızlık düzeyi ile enflasyon oranları arasında ters yönlü bir ilişkinin geçerli olduğu sonucu elde edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ve devir hızı değişkenlerinin, reel Gayrisafi Yurt İçi Hâsıla artışı ve bütçe açıkları üzerindeki etkileri ele alınmıştır.

Keywords

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