On Optimal Toll Design for Bosporus Crossings

Year 2022, Volume: 30 Issue: 54, 121 - 144, 25.10.2022

Özgün Ekici

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2022.04.06

Abstract

For many years, two toll bridges served commuter demand to cross the strait called Bosporus in Istanbul, Turkey. An underground connection called the Eurasian tunnel had been recently launched to relieve the strait's traffic. We study a simple transportation model that incorporates the forces that have come into play after the opening of the Eurasian tunnel. We find that for welfare maximisation, the premium paid for using the tunnel should be fixed in the two directions and not excessive. The current toll regime violates these features, and we recommend its amendment in light of our findings.

Keywords

Congestion, Toll Bridges, Mixed Duopoly, Regulation, Bosporus

Boğaziçi Geçişleri için Optimal Geçiş Ücreti Tasarımı Üzerine

Abstract

Uzun yıllar boyunca, İstanbul Boğazı’nı geçmek isteyen taşıtlara iki ücretli köprü hizmet verdi. Yakın bir zaman önce ise, Boğaz’da oluşan trafiği rahatlatmak amacı ile Avrasya tüneli adı verilen bir yeraltı bağlantısı hizmete açıldı. Bu çalışmada, Avrasya tünelinin açılmasından sonra devreye giren güçleri bünyesinde barındıran basit bir ulaşım modelini ele aldık. Yaptığımız analizler, refahın maksimizasyonu için, tünel kullanımı için ödenen primin iki yönde aynı olması ve aşırı olmaması gerektiğini ortaya koyuyor. Mevcut geçiş ücret rejimi bu özellikleri ihlal etmekte. Bulgularımızın ışığında mevcut geçiş ücret rejiminde iyileştirme yapılmasını öneriyoruz.

Keywords

Trafik Sıkışıklığı, Ücretli Köprü, Yarı Kamusal Düopol, Regülasyon, Boğaziçi

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