Zarar Önleme Modeli Kullanılarak Bitkisel Verim Sigortası için Ahlaki Tehlike Analizi

Year 2025, Volume: 33 Issue: 63, 87 - 102

Güven Şimşek , Kasırga Yıldırak

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2025.01.04

Abstract

Çiftçiler tarımsal üretimde en önemli rolü oynarlar ve tarımsal üretime devam edebilmeleri için kendilerini bununla ilişkili risklere karşı korumaları gerekir. Bu teminat gereksinimini karşılamak üzere tasarlanmış bir sigorta planı sunmak çok önemlidir. Tarım sigortası ürünleri arasında, ekosistemin sürdürülebilirliğini destekleyen tarımsal üretimi belirli bir seviyede tutmayı amaçladığı için bitkisel ürün verim sigortası benzersiz bir role sahiptir. Çalışma, sigortacının çiftçinin çabaları hakkında tam bilgi sahibi olmaması nedeniyle asimetrik bilgi senaryolarını ele almaktadır. Optimum kayıp önleme çabası için çözümler sunmakta ve gözlemlenebilir ve gözlemlenemeyen çabalar arasındaki boşluğu doldurmayı önermektedir. Gözlemlenebilen ve gözlemlenemeyen çabalar ile optimal sözleşmeler karşılaştırıldığında, prim indirimindeki marjinal fayda gözlemlenemeyen çabalar için ihmal edilmektedir. Bu durum, ahlaki tehlikeyi vurgulamakta ve verimsiz ürün sigortası fiyatlandırmasına yol açmaktadır. Sonuçlar beklenen fayda teorisi kullanılarak elde edilmiştir. Kesinlik eşdeğeri yaklaşımı da sonuçları sayısal ve grafiksel olarak göstermek için kullanılmıştır.

Keywords

Asimetrik Bilgi, Kesinlik Eşdeğeri, Hasar Önleme, Ahlaki Tehlike, Optimal Çaba

Moral Hazard Analysis for Crop Yield Insurance Using Loss Prevention Model

Abstract

Farmers play the most critical role in agricultural production, and to keep producing, they must safeguard themselves against the associated risks. Offering an insurance plan designed to fulfil this coverage requirement is crucial. Among agricultural insurance products, crop yield insurance has a unique role since it aims to maintain agricultural production at a specific level, which promotes ecosystem sustainability. The study addresses scenarios of asymmetric information due to the insurer's need for more complete knowledge about the farmer's efforts. It provides solutions for optimal loss prevention efforts and suggests bridging the gap between observable and unobservable efforts. Comparing optimal contracts with observable and non-observable efforts, the marginal benefit in premium reduction is omitted for non-observable efforts. This highlights moral hazard, leading to inefficient crop insurance pricing. The results are generated using the expected utility theory. The certainty equivalent approach is also used to illustrate the results numerically and graphically.

Keywords

Asymmetric Information, Certainty Equivalent, Loss Prevention, Moral Hazard, Optimal Effort

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