An Analysis of Chile’s 2022 and 2023 Constitutional Proposals: Fails of the Aversive and Transformative Constitutionalism Attempts

Öz

In Chile, since 1980, there has been a debate over making amendments or writing a new constitution in academic, political and civil environment; notwithstanding that Chile amongst countries in Latina America has a democratic, stable and resilient constitutional order. The 1980 Constitution has been amended numerous times; nevertheless, society has still demanded a new constitution in that it still seems to be connected to the constitution of the dicta regime. It has criticized that social rights are not designed well in the existing constitution, and there has been a link between constitutional order and economic model of Chile. Therefore, Chilean has expected a protection system for social rights and believed that negative condition in social order could be transformed by a new constitution. As a result of the 2019 protests, the social transformation demands again showed up and became a driven-force of a new constitution-making. Yet people, who showed their strong demand in the referendum which 80 percent of all of voters voted in favour of a new constitution, paradoxically refused the proposals more than once. The Constitution-making process was built on transformation of public and aversion from the existing constitutional order. Howsoever, the 2022 proposal appeared to be radical and caused public nervous, while the 2023 proposal seemed conservative and insufficient regarding the transformation demand. People still wait for a new constitution; they just did not feel obliged to accept what were offered. In public opinion, the aversive and transformative constitutionalism is still viable for a new constitution-making.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Chilean Constitution
• post-sovereign constitutionalism
• transformative constitutionalism
• aversive constitutionalism
• constitution assembly
• democratic constitution-making
• democracy
• writing a new constitution

2022 VE 2023 ŞİLİ ANAYASA TASLAKLARININ TAHLİLİ: KAÇINMACI VE DÖNÜŞÜMCÜ ANAYASACILIK DENEMELERİNDE BAŞARISIZLIK

Öz

Latin Amerika ülkeleri içerisinde yerleşik, kırılgan olmayan ve dengeli bir demokratik anayasal düzeni bulunmasına rağmen Şili’de anayasa değişiklikleri ve yeni bir anayasa yapma konusu, 1980 tarihinden beri önemli bir akademik, siyasi ve toplumsal tartışma olarak sürmeye devam etmektedir. Dikta rejimini sonlandıran 1980 Şili Anayasası, bugüne kadar çok fazla değişikliğe uğramış olsa da hala dikta rejimi ile bağlantılı görüldüğü için, halk tarafından yeni bir anayasa talep edilmektedir. Mevcut anayasa ile ilgili eleştiriler, sosyal hakların yetersiz olması üzerinde birleşmektedir. Anayasal düzen ile iktisadi yapı arasında bağ kurularak sosyal hakların daha fazla güvenceye kavuşturulması temel istektir. Esasen toplum yapısının içinde bulunduğu olumsuz koşullardan anayasal düzen marifeti ile kurtulacağı fikri hakimdir. Ekim 2019 yılında yapılan gösteriler ile birlikte bahse konu toplumsal dönüşüm talepleri tekrar gündeme gelmiş ve yeni bir anayasa yapımının itici gücü olmuştur. Yeni bir anayasa yapılmasına ilişkin yapılan referandumda %80’e yakın bir oy oranı ile yeni anayasa yapımını isteyen halk iki farklı anayasa taslağını da %80’e yakın oy oranı ile reddetmiştir. Yeni anayasa yapımı, toplumu dönüştürmek ve 1980 Anayasası’nın öngördüğü düzenden kaçınmak üzere kurulmuştur. Fakat 2022 taslağı oldukça radikal bulunmuş ve toplumu ürkütmüş iken 2023 taslağı ise toplumun dönüşüm talebine göre muhafazakâr ve yetersiz bulunmuştur. Halk yeni bir anayasayı hala talep etmektedir, sadece önerileri kabul etmek zorunda hissetmemişlerdir. Yeni anayasa yapımı konusunda ise dönüşümcülük ve kaçınmacılık yaklaşımları hala geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Zira Pinochet diktasının temsil ettiği anayasal düzenden kaçınmak ve toplumda gerçekleşmesi beklenen dönüşümün tamamlanması hala bir anayasal hedeftir. Ayrıca toplumsal dönüşümün Bolivaryan usullerle yapılmaması da ikinci bir kaçınma noktasını oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Şili Anayasası
• post-egemen anayasacılık
• dönüşümcü anayasacılık
• kaçınmacı anayasacılık
• anayasa meclisi
• demokratik anayasa yapımı
• demokrasi
• anayasa yazımı

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