Rethinking the Problem of Induction: An Ontological-Realist Approach

Abstract

This article reconsiders the problem of induction from an ontological-realist perspective by moving beyond the classical debate over epistemic justification. As Hume showed, a finite set of observations does not entail conclusions about unobserved cases or future events with logical necessity. Post-Humean responses have illuminated different dimensions of the problem: Kant analyzed the transcendental conditions of objective experience; Mill developed canons of causal inquiry; Peirce emphasized inquiry, real generalities, and long-run convergence; Reichenbach offered a pragmatic vindication; Bayesian-Laplacian approaches modeled probabilistic updating; Goodman reformulated the issue as a problem of projectibility; and Popper placed falsification and critical testing at the center of scientific rationality. Through conceptual analysis, critical comparison, and philosophical argumentation, the article argues not that these approaches are wholly devoid of ontological commitments, but that they do not systematically connect ontological order with epistemic warrant. Structural continuities, causal powers, tendencies, and relational patterns in mind-independent reality are necessary conditions of inductive learning. Yet ontological order alone is not sufficient to make a particular inference reliable. Reliability also depends on whether inquiry tracks the relevant structures through representative observation, controlled comparison, experimentation, mechanism research, independent testing, and error correction. Physical, biological, and social domains contain different kinds of structures and sources of change, but this difference does not establish a fixed hierarchy of reliability among the sciences. The strength of an inductive inference varies with the stability of the relevant mechanisms, the openness of the system, the specification of contextual and boundary conditions, and the quality of epistemic controls. The resulting view preserves Hume’s objection to demonstrative justification while explaining why induction can nevertheless be a fallible yet rational mode of inquiry. Ontological realism does not provide logical certainty for induction; it offers a complementary account of why inductive inferences can succeed under determinate conditions.

Keywords

• Philosophy of science
• problem of induction
• causality
• ontological realism
• stratified reality

Project Number

Yok

Tümevarım Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Ontolojik-Realist Bir Yaklaşım

Abstract

Bu çalışma, tümevarım sorununu klasik epistemolojik gerekçelendirme tartışmasının ötesine taşıyarak ontolojik-realist bir perspektiften yeniden değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Hume’un gösterdiği üzere, sonlu sayıdaki gözlemden gözlenmemiş durumlar veya gelecekteki olaylar hakkında ulaşılan sonuçlar, mantıksal bir zorunluluk taşımaz. Hume sonrasında Kant’ın aşkınsal koşullar çözümlemesi, Mill’in bilimsel yöntem anlayışı, Peirce’ün araştırma, gerçek genellikler ve uzun vadeli yakınsama vurgusu, Reichenbach’ın pragmatik haklı çıkarma girişimi, Bayes-Laplace çizgisinin olasılıksal güncelleme modeli, Goodman’ın yansıtılabilirlik problemi ve Popper’ın yanlışlama stratejisi sorunun farklı boyutlarını açıklığa kavuşturmuştur. Makale, bu yaklaşımları kavramsal çözümleme, eleştirel karşılaştırma ve felsefi argümantasyon yoluyla incelemektedir. Temel sav, önceki yaklaşımların ontolojiyi bütünüyle dışladığı değil, ontolojik düzen ile epistemik gerekçelendirme arasındaki bağı sistematik biçimde kurmadığıdır. Tümevarımsal öğrenmenin mümkün olabilmesi için insan zihninden bağımsız gerçeklikte yapısal sürekliliklerin, nedensel güçlerin, eğilimlerin ve ilişkisel örüntülerin bulunması gerekir. Ancak ontolojik düzen belirli bir tümevarımsal çıkarımı tek başına güvenilir kılmaz. Güvenilirlik, bu düzenin temsil edici gözlem, karşılaştırma, deney, mekanizma araştırması, bağımsız sınama ve hata düzeltme aracılığıyla ne ölçüde izlenebildiğine bağlıdır. Fiziksel, biyolojik ve toplumsal alanlar farklı yapılar ve değişim kaynakları içerir; fakat bu farklılık değişmez bir güvenilirlik hiyerarşisi doğurmaz. Çıkarımın gücü, mekanizmaların kararlılığına, sistemin açıklığına, bağlamın belirlenebilmesine ve epistemik denetimin niteliğine göre değişir. Sonuç olarak ontolojik realizm, tümevarımın mantıksal kesinliğini temellendirmese de tümevarımsal çıkarımların neden belirli koşullarda başarılı olabildiğine ilişkin tamamlayıcı bir açıklama sunmaktadır.

Keywords

• Bilim felsefesi
• tümevarım sorunu
• nedensellik
• ontolojik realizm
• tabakalı gerçeklik

Supporting Institution

Yok

Project Number

Yok

Ethical Statement

Çalışmada etik bir ihlal bulunmamaktadır.

Thanks

Yok

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