İran ile Nükleer Müzakereler ve Türkiye’nin Avrupa’ya Uzanan Enerji Merkezi Rolü

Year 2022, , 349 - 374, 19.08.2022

Akif Bahadır Kaynak

https://doi.org/10.30626/tesamakademi.1087289

Abstract

Türkiye’nin, Orta Asya ve Ortadoğu ülkelerinden Avrupa’ya uzanan bir enerji köprüsü olarak rolü son on yılların en tartışmalı gündemlerinden biri olmuştur. Hem Avrupa’nın enerji arz güvenliği hem de üretici ülkelerin karlı pazarlara ulaşımı bakımından Türkiye önemli bir fırsat sunmaya devam etmektedir. Türkiye’nin öncelikle kendi ihtiyaçlarını karşılayabilmek için üretici ülkelerle kurduğu enerji köprüleri, zamanla Avrupa pazarına ulaşacak Güney Enerji Koridorunun şekillenmesine sebep olmaktadır. 2020 yılı kapanırken faaliyete geçen TANAP ve Güney İtalya’ya uzanan TAP ile birlikte önce Azeri gazının Avrupa pazarına ulaşımında ilk adım atılmıştır. Son Ukrayna-Rusya çatışması ile birlikte enerji piyasalarında yaşanan çalkantı ve Rusya’nın güvenilir tedarikçi rolünün sarsılması alternatif tedarik yollarının önemini tekrar vurgulamaktadır. Nükleer müzakereler başarıya ulaştığı takdirde İran’ın yeniden doğalgaz piyasalarına dönüşü bu koridorun önemini artırıyor olacaktır. Üretiminin bir kısmını sıvılaştırılmış gaz olarak satmayı tercih edecek İran, botu hatları yoluyla Hindistan pazarına ve Avrupa’daki tüketicilere de ulaşmak isteyecektir. Dünyanın en büyük konvansiyonel rezervlerine sahip ülkesinin Avrupa pazarına ulaşması için Türkiye’nin coğrafi konumu eşsiz bir imkân sunmaktadır.

Keywords

İran Nükleer Müzakereler, Güney Enerji Koridoru, TANAP, Enerji Arz Güvenliği

Nuclear Negotiations with Iran and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Corridor Reaching Europe

Abstract

Turkey’s role as an energy conduit connecting Central Asia and the Middle East with European markets has been one of the most controversial topics of the last decades. Turkey offers a unique opportunity not only to the EU which seeks to diversify its energy suppliers but also to producer countries that need access to markets. The oil and gas pipelines that were first laid out to reach the national grid have become the backbone of the Southern Corridor reaching into European markets. TANAP, which started operations at the end of 2020, and TAP which will reach out to southern Italy from the Turkish border, were the first steps to bring Azeri gas into Europe. The latest Russia-Ukraine military confrontation and compromising the status of Russia as a reliable energy supplier underlines the importance of alternative supply routes once again. A probable entry of Iran into natural gas markets after the conclusion of nuclear negotiations will increase the significance of this corridor. Iran may prefer to sell some of its production in the form of liquified gas while the rest will be delivered through pipelines to India and to the European consumers. Turkey can be a valuable energy venue to the country with the largest proven conventional natural gas reserves in the world in terms of access to the markets.

Keywords

Iran Nuclear Negotiations, Southern Energy Corridor, TANAP, Energy Security

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