The Munich Syndrome has been considered a constraint in the peace process decision-making of Israel. By raising questions such as what obstructs peacemaking in Israel, its costs, and whether it can force peace, the study employs the Munich analogy as a “historical lesson” method to examine why and how peace has turned into an anomaly in Israel. The Munich Agreement of 1938 by Britain and France, amid raging anti-Jewish violence in Europe, sought to appease Adolf Hitler by acquiescing to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia to prevent the world war outbreak, which, however, backfired and emerged as a metaphor for foreign policy decision-making weakness. This historical lesson has impacted Israeli society’s and its leaders’ attitudes towards peace, turning it into a Rubicon line. The study uses the 1970-1978 Arab- Israeli peace process as a case study to explain how the Munich Syndrome impedes peacemaking decisions and potential ways of overcoming it. It argues that a possible way to encourage Israel to make peace with its adversaries is with third parties providing significant concessions and guarantees.
Primary Language | English |
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Subjects | Regional Studies |
Journal Section | Makaleler |
Authors | |
Early Pub Date | November 8, 2024 |
Publication Date | December 8, 2024 |
Submission Date | April 30, 2024 |
Acceptance Date | October 9, 2024 |
Published in Issue | Year 2024 Volume: 11 Issue: 2 |
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