Irak’taki Şii Milislerin Çatı Yapılanması Halk Seferberlik Güçleri (Haşdi Şaabi)’nin Gelişimi, Geleceği ve Ulus Devlet İnşasına Etkileri

Abstract

Irak’taki Şii milis güçlerinin düzenli orduya entegrasyon süreci, bu dönüşümün askeri, siyasi ve toplumsal etkileri inşacı teori çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel hipotezi, entegrasyonun Irak’ın güvenlik yapısı ve siyasi istikrarında olumlu etkiler yaratmasına rağmen, milis gruplarının özerk hareket etme kapasitesi ve bölgesel güçlerin etkisi nedeniyle sürecin zorlaştığı, uzun vadede siyasi çekişmelere yol açtığıdır. 2014’te DEAŞ (Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti) tehdidine karşı Ayetullah Ali es-Sistani’nin fetvasıyla kurulan Haşdi Şabi (Halk Seferberlik Güçleri, HŞ) 2016’da yasal olarak Irak güvenlik güçlerinin bir parçası haline gelse de uygulamada Haşdi Şabi Komisyonu aracılığıyla Savunma Bakanlığına paralel, özerk bir yapı oluşturmuştur. Haşdi Şabi’yi dönüştürme çabaları milis liderlerin siyasi direnişi ve İran’a olan ideolojik bağlılıkları nedeniyle başarısız kalmaktadır. Tam entegrasyona yönelik hukuki zorluklar arasında, Haşdi Şabi’nin anayasal milis yasağını dolaylı olarak delmesi ve yargı sisteminin milis liderleri karşısında hesap verebilirlik sağlayamaması öne çıkmaktadır. Lübnan’daki Hizbullah, Suriye’deki Ulusal Savunma Güçleri ve Yemen’deki Husiler gibi örnekler, tam asimilasyonun istisnai, hibritleşmenin ise tipik desen olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu örnekler ışığında, Irak’taki milislerin de İran Devrim Muhafızları gibi paralel, kurumsal bir yapıya dönüşme ihtimali güçlüdür. Sonuç olarak, milislerin dağıtılması (fesih) kısa vadede gerçekçi bir senaryo olmamakla birlikte, en muhtemel gidişatın, katı devlet kontrolü bulunmayan, ancak yasal meşruiyetle kurumsallaşmış "hibrit bir güvenlik düzeni" ile yaşamak olduğu öngörülmüştür. Bu süreç, ancak sivil denetim, bütçe şeffaflığı ve hesap verebilirlik mekanizmaları ile maliyetleri azaltılabilen bir "koşullu dönüşümü” işaret etmektedir.

Keywords

• Haşdi Şaabi
• Düzenli Orduya Entegrasyon
• İnşacı Teori
• Irak Güvenlik Mimarisi
• İran

The Development, Future and Impact Of The Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd Al-Shaabi) The Umberalla Structure Of The Shiite Militias In Iraq, On Nation State Building

Abstract

This analysis explores the integration of Shia militia forces into the regular army in Iraq and the subsequent military, political, and social ramifications of this transition via the lens of constructivist theory. The study's primary hypothesis posits that although integration has beneficially affected Iraq's security framework and political stability, the process has been hindered by the militias' ability to operate independently and the sway of regional powers, resulting in enduring political strife. Founded in 2014 following a fatwa from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to address the ISIS menace, Hashd al-Shaabi was formally integrated into the Iraqi security forces in 2016; nonetheless, it has effectively created an autonomous entity that operates alongside the Ministry of Defense via the Hashd al-Shaabi Commission. Attempts to reform Hashd al-Shaabi have been thwarted by the political opposition and ideological loyalty of the militia leaders to Iran. Among the legal obstacles to complete integration, Hashd al-Shaabi's indirect contravention of the constitutional prohibition on militias and the judiciary's failure to hold militia commanders accountable are particularly notable. Instances like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the National Defense Forces in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen illustrate that complete absorption is rare, rather hybridization is the prevailing trend. Given these instances, it is quite probable that the militias in Iraq will evolve into a parallel, institutionalized entity akin to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Therefore, although the disbandment of the militias is not a feasible prospect in the near term, the anticipated conclusion is the establishment of a "hybrid security order" that is legally sanctioned and lacks stringent official oversight. Only civilian control, financial transparency, and accountability measures can alleviate the expenses of this process, indicating a "conditional transformation."

Keywords

• Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
• Regular Army Integration
• Constructivism
• Iraqi Security Architecture
• Iran

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