THE APPROACH OF FINLAND TO RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF UKRAINE: SECURITISATION OF THE PUTIN REGIME / Rusya’nın Ukrayna’yı İşgaline Finlandiya’nın Yaklaşımı: Putin Rejiminin Güvenlikleştirilmesi

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explain the approach of Finland to Russian occupation of Ukraine. Finnish foreign policy implemented between February 24 when Ukraine-Russia War began, and June 30, is analysed by using securitisation theory developed by the Copenhagen School. This study argues that Finland securitised the Putin regime. As a consequence of securitisation analysis, the article reached four results. First, Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin and President Sauli Niinistö see Russia under the Putin government as a military threat. Second, Prime Minister Sanna Marin and President Sauli Niinistö want to make Finland a member of NATO to strengthen defence capabilities of the country against Russia. Third, Finland securitised the Putin regime. Fourth, as a member of the European Union, Finland has applied collective EU sanctions on Russia, President Vladimir Putin and his close partners. By applying for NATO membership, Finland abandoned the policy of military neutrality that it has been implementing since the 20th century.

Keywords

• Securitisation Theory
• Finland
• Ukraine-Russia War
• the Putin Regime

THE APPROACH OF FINLAND TO RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF UKRAINE: SECURITISATION OF THE PUTIN REGIME / Rusya’nın Ukrayna’yı İşgaline Finlandiya’nın Yaklaşımı: Putin Rejiminin Güvenlikleştirilmesi

Abstract

Bu makalenin amacı, Finlandiya'nın Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgaline yaklaşımını açıklamaktır. Ukrayna-Rusya Savaşı'nın başladığı 24 Şubat ile 30 Haziran arasında uygulanan Finlandiya dış politikası, Kopenhag Okulu tarafından geliştirilen güvenlikleştirme teorisi kullanılarak analiz edilmektedir. Bu çalışma Finlandiya'nın Putin rejimini güvenlikleştirdiğini iddia etmektedir. Güvenlikleştirme analizi sonucunda makale dört sonuca ulaşmıştır. Birincisi, Finlandiya Başbakanı Sanna Marin ve Devlet Başkanı Sauli Niinistö, Putin hükümeti altındaki Rusya'yı askeri bir tehdit olarak görmektedir. İkincisi, Başbakan Sanna Marin ve Cumhurbaşkanı Sauli Niinistö, ülkenin Rusya'ya karşı savunma yeteneklerini güçlendirmek için Finlandiya'yı NATO üyesi yapmak istemektedir. Üçüncüsü, Finlandiya Putin rejimini güvenlikleştirmiştir. Dördüncüsü, Avrupa Birliği üyesi olan Finlandiya, Rusya, Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin ve yakın ortaklarına toplu olarak AB yaptırımlarını uygulamıştır. Finlandiya NATO üyeliğine başvurarak 20.yüzyıldan beri uyguladığı askeri tarafsızlık politikasını terk etmiştir.

Keywords

• Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi
• Finlandiya
• Ukrayna-Rusya Savaşı
• Putin Rejimi

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