Direniş ve Karşı Direniş Harekatı Örneği Olarak: Afganistan

Year 2016, Volume: 5 Issue: 9, 23 - 44, 01.01.2016

Mehmet Güneş Özkan Özer

Abstract

Afganistan’da devlet otoritesin Afganistan genelinde tesis edilmesinde önemli rol oynayacak iki temel unsur Afgan güvenlik güçlerinin direnişçileri alt edebilecek yeterliliğe ulaştırılması ve Pakistan sınırının direnişçilerin sızmalarına karşı güvenliğinin sağlanmasıdır. Ayrıca, istikrara katkı sağlayacak unsurlar arasında, Taliban ile uzlaşma sağlanması, hükümet kurumlarının gerek ulusal gerekse yerel alanda işlerliğinin gerçekleştirilmesi, yaygın yolsuzluğun azaltılması, halkın güvenliğinin ve temel hizmetlere erişiminin sağlanması gibi unsurlar yer almaktadır. Bu hususlar direniş hareketinin gidişatına doğrudan etki edecek niteliktedir. Bu çalışmada asıl üzerinde durulan husus, NATO’nun Afganistan çatışma ortamı için modellediği karşı direniş harekâtının başarılı bir şekilde uygulanıp uygulanmadığına, uygulamada nasıl hatalar yapıldığına yönelik bir değerlendirme ortaya konulmasıdır

Keywords

Direniş, Karşı Direniş, Afganistan, Silahlı Çatışma.

AS A CASE OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: AFGHANISTAN

Abstract

In Afghanistan, two basic elements will play an important role in establishing state authority across the country, Afghan security forces will be reached a capacity to be able to defeat the insurgents and is to provide security against infiltration of insurgents from the border with Pakistan. On the other hand, among the factors that contribute to stability are there such elements, reconciliation with the Taliban, and functioning government institutions in both national and local areas, the implementation of widespread corruption reduction, ensuring public safety and access to basic services. These matters are in nature that will directly affect the course of the insurgency movement. The main focus of this study is to provide an assessment on NATO’s counterinsurgency model for Afghanistan conflict, as whether successfully applied and how mistakes made in practice

Keywords

Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, Armed Conflict.

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