STATE INTERVENTION AS AN ANTECEDENT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN TURKISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES

Year 2020, Issue: 29, 97 - 112, 10.10.2020

İrem Tore

https://doi.org/10.18092/ulikidince.594033

Abstract

Dağınık mülkiyet yapısının yoğun olarak görüldüğü ABD ve İngiltere’nin aksine dünya çapında şirketlerde yoğunlaşmış mülkiyet yapısı görülmektedir. Şeffaflık kalitesinin, mülkiyet yapılarıyla doğrudan ilişkili olduğu göz önüne alındığında şirketlerin mülkiyet yapısını belirleyen dinamiklerin şirket yönetimini nasıl şekillendirdiği anlaşılmadan şeffaflık kavramını kavramak mümkün değildir. Daha önce yapılan çalışmalar, Türk anonim şirketlerinin yoğunlaşmış ve merkezi aile temelli mülkiyet yapısına sahip olduğunu ortaya koymuş ancak bu mülkiyet yapısına neden olan faktörler nadiren dikkate alınmıştır. Fakat bu faktörler şeffaflık standartlarının belirlenmesinde önem taşır. Bu çalışma Türk şirketlerinde yoğunlaşmış mülkiyet yapısının hakim olmasının nedenlerini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın sonucu işletme faaliyetlerine ağır devlet müdahalesinin mülkiyet ve dolaylı olarak şeffaflık yapısına şekil verdiğini göstermektedir.

Keywords

Mülkiyet yapısı, Şeffaflık, Kurumsal Yönetim

STATE INTERVENTION AS AN ANTECEDENT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN TURKISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES

Abstract

Dispersed ownership is not the rule except for the US and UK. Instead, companies are concentrated in the hand of families in the rest of the world. It is stated that the quality of transparency is directly associated with the ownership structures. Thus, it is not possible to comprehend transparency practise followed by firms without understanding how their capital structure and dynamics of this structure affect their management. Previous studies have found that Turkish joint-stock companies have highly concentrated and centralized family based ownership structure but the foundations of having this ownership structure are rarely taken into consideration. This is particularly important in setting the standards for transparency. This study attempts to trace back the ownership structure of Turkish companies to explain why families are the dominant shareholders in this structure. The results show that heavy government intervention in business activities affects the complexity of organizational structures and the transparency practices of companies.

Keywords

Ownership structure, corporate governance, Transparency

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