Antik Dünyadan Günümüze Tiksindirici Borç: Bir Doktrinin Tarihsel ve Hukuksal Evrimi

Abstract

Tiksindirici borç (odious debt) doktrini, modern uluslararası hukukun en tartışmalı kesişim noktalarından birini (devlet halefiyeti, egemen borç ve geçiş dönemi adaleti) bir araya getiren melez bir kavramdır. Klasik biçimiyle 1927'de Rus asıllı hukukçu Alexander Nahum Sack tarafından sistemleştirilen doktrin, bir devlet borcunun (i) halkın rızası olmadan, (ii) halkın yararına kullanılmadan ve (iii) bunu bilen ya da bilmesi gereken alacaklılar tarafından sağlanması durumunda halef yönetim için bağlayıcı sayılmaması gerektiğini ileri sürer. Çalışma, niteliksel-tarihsel bir hukuk inceleme yöntemi benimseyerek birincil kaynaklar ile ikincil literatürü bütünleştirmekte ve üç temel soru çerçevesinde gelişmektedir. Birincisi, modern doktrinin tarihsel öncülleri nelerdir ve antik dönemin borç iptal pratikleriyle çağdaş doktrin arasında ne tür kavramsal süreklilikler ya da kopuşlar mevcuttur? İkincisi, Sack'in 1927 incelemesinden 1923 Tinoco Tahkimi'ne, 1983 Viyana Sözleşmesi'ne ve 2007 UNCTAD raporuna uzanan kodifikasyon süreci doktrinin hukuksal statüsünü nasıl şekillendirmiştir? Üçüncüsü, yirmi birinci yüzyılın egemen borç krizleri, özellikle Irak, Ekvador, Ukrayna ve Suriye vakaları bağlamında doktrinin operasyonel önemi nedir ve ne tür eleştirilerle karşılaşmaktadır? Makale, doktrinin kavramsal köklerini Mezopotamya'nın amargi geleneğine, İbrani Yubile Yılı'na, Solon'un seisachtheia reformuna ve Roma hukukunun yönetici-devlet ayrımına kadar izlemekte; bu mirası Meksika (1867) ve Küba (1898) gibi on dokuzuncu yüzyıl öncülleriyle bütünleştirerek borcun kutsallığının her zaman koşullu olduğunu göstermektedir. Çalışma, doktrinin yerleşmiş bir uluslararası örf-adet hukuku kuralı haline gelememekle birlikte, kavramsal yaşam ile hukuksal kristalizasyon arasındaki yarıkta varlığını sürdürdüğünü ve çağdaş uygulamalarda "fiili kabul, hukuki ret" örüntüsünü koruduğunu saptamaktadır. Sonuç olarak doktrin, yerleşik bir hukuk kuralından çok bir hukuksal-siyasal referans çerçevesi olarak işlemekte; otoriter rejimlerin yıkılmasının ardından gündeme gelen borç krizleri için vazgeçilmez bir normatif çerçeve sunmaya devam etmektedir.

Keywords

• İktisat Teorisi
• Hukuk ve İktisat
• Tiksindirici Borç
• Kurumsal İktisat.

Odious Debt from the Ancient World to the Present: The Historical and Legal Evolution of a Doctrine

Abstract

The doctrine of odious debt constitutes a hybrid concept that brings together one of the most contentious intersections of modern international law: state succession, sovereign debt, and transitional justice. In its classical formulation, systematized in 1927 by the Russian jurist Alexander Nahum Sack, the doctrine holds that a state debt should not be binding on a successor regime if it was incurred (i) without the consent of the people, (ii) not for the benefit of the people, and (iii) with the knowledge, or presumed knowledge, of the creditors. Adopting a qualitative-historical method of legal analysis that integrates primary sources with the secondary literature, this article is developed around three research questions. First, what are the historical antecedents of the modern doctrine, and what conceptual continuities or discontinuities exist between ancient debt cancellation practices and the contemporary doctrine? Second, how has the codification process, extending from Sack's 1927 treatise through the 1923 Tinoco arbitration and the 1983 Vienna Convention to the 2007 UNCTAD report, shaped the doctrine's legal status? Third, what is the operational significance of the doctrine in the context of twenty-first-century sovereign debt crises, particularly those of Iraq, Ecuador, Ukraine, and Syria? Tracing the conceptual roots of the doctrine back to the Mesopotamian amargi tradition, the Hebrew Jubilee Year, Solon's seisachtheia reform, and the Roman ruler-state distinction, the article shows that the sanctity of debt has always been conditional. It finds that, although the doctrine has not crystallized into an established rule of customary international law, it persists in the gap between conceptual vitality and legal codification, retaining a pattern of de facto acceptance and de jure rejection in contemporary practice. The study concludes that the doctrine nevertheless provides an indispensable normative reference framework for debt crises arising in the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarian regimes.

Keywords

• Economic Theory
• Law and Economics
• Odious Debt
• Institutional Economics.

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