Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Çatışma Yönetim Stratejilerinin Karşılıklı Etkileşimi ve Denetçilere Yönelik Bir Uygulama

Year 2023, , 607 - 625, 25.05.2023

Gürbüz Aydın Hakan Karabacak

https://doi.org/10.21076/vizyoner.1071129

Abstract

Bu çalışmada çatışma sürecinin etkileşimli doğası dikkate alarak karar alıcı tarafların çatışma yönetim stratejilerinin birlikte analiz edilmesi ve en uygun stratejilerin tespit edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Analiz ve modelleme aracı olarak oyun teorisi yaklaşımı kullanılmıştır. Analiz sürecinde öncelikle tarafların çatışma yönetim stratejileri eşleştirilmiş ve Karşılıklı İkili İlgi Modeli adı verilen yeni bir model ortaya konmuştur. Model kapsamında çatışma yönetim stratejileri, ilgili literatür dikkate alınarak rekabetçi veya işbirlikçi niteliklerine göre sınıflandırılmıştır. Taraflar arasındaki etkileşimler bağlamında, çatışma yönetim stratejileri oyun teorisinin temel oyun formlarıyla incelenmiş ve denge analizleri yapılarak kuramsal sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. Bu kuramsal sonuçlar denetçilere yönelik ampirik bir araştırmayla ölçülmüştür. Modelin Mahkûmlar İkilemi oyunu kapsamında analizi tarafların rekabet ve işbirliği stratejilerini birlikte benimsedikleri Nash dengesinin varlığına ve işbirliği dengesinin sürdürülebilirliğine yönelik kuramsal sonuçları desteklemektedir. Modelin Tavuk oyunu kapsamında analizi, en az bir tarafın rekabetçi tutum benimsemediği dengenin varlığına ve rekabetin sürdürülebilir olmadığına yönelik kuramsal sonuçları desteklemektedir. Modelin Geyik Avı oyunu kapsamında analizi ise her iki tarafın işbirliği stratejini seçtikleri dengenin varlığına ve işbirliği tutumunun sürdürülebilir olduğuna yönelik kuramsal sonuçları desteklemektedir.

Keywords

Çatışma Yönetim Stratejileri, İkili İlgi Modeli, Oyun Teorisi

Mutual Interaction of Conflict Management Strategies from A Game Theory Perspective and An Empirical Evidence from Auditors

Abstract

In the study, it is aimed to evaluate the conflict management strategies of the decision makers and to determine the optimal strategies, by taking the interactive nature of the conflict process into account. Game theory is adopted as an analysis and modeling tool. In the analysis process, firstly, the conflict management strategies of the parties are matched and a new model, namely Mutual Dual Concern Model, is introduced. The conflict management strategies are classified according to their competitive or cooperative characteristics considering the relevant literature. In the context of interactions between the parties, conflict management strategies are examined with the basic game forms of game theory and theoretical results are reached by equilibrium analyzes. These theoretical results are measured by an empirical study. The analysis in the context of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game supports the theoretical conclusions regarding the existence of the Nash equilibrium in which the parties adopt the competition and cooperation strategies together and the sustainability of the cooperation equilibrium. The analysis in the scope of the game of Chicken supports the theoretical conclusions that there is an equilibrium in which at least one player does not adopt a competitive attitude and that the competition is not sustainable. The analysis in the scope of the Stag hunt game supports the theoretical results that the equilibrium in which both parties choose the cooperation strategies and that the cooperative attitude is sustainable.

Keywords

Conflict Management Strategies, Dual Concern Model, Game Theory

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