In a politically surprising announcement (November, 2000), Chiluba was to drop his disenfranchising charge against Kaunda. Kaunda responded by saying that Chiluba did not have a case all along and that his act was a demonstration of his political cowardice.
Apparently, it transpired that Guei was holed up in a hideout inside the country contradicting earlier rumours about his unceremonious exit.
Gbagbo repeated the stance taken by his predecessors of disenfranchising Ouattara.
See The East African "EU Concerned About Zanzibar", Nation Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, October 16th-22nd, 2000, p.36. The weekly publication notes: "There have been reports of police harassing opposition supporters, disrupting party meetings, conducting unwarranted house searches, in barring meetings of more than two persons in the streets of Zanzibar…The Electoral Commission has also been accused of omitting hundreds of CUF supporters from the voters' roll, in a move to reduce the number of opposition votes".
Consider, for instance, the announcement made in December, 2000, by the donor community to resume development aid. It was reported that the aid-givers were "..satisfied with the leadership of the newly elected Zanzibar President.." For this stance, see The East African, "Donors May Resume Aid to Zanzibar", December 25-31, 2000, p.1, Nairobi, Kenya.
Note the remarks made by the American Ambassador to Tanzania, Rev, Charles Stith, when he unabashedly endorsed through praise the new CCM government of Zanzibar. See ibid, The East African, p.28.
Ibid, p. 28.
The initiative appears to have been triggered by two broad concerns: one, consternation over Israel’s illegal occupation of Arab lands seized during wars, and two, the realization that Israel and the then South African Apartheid regime were working hard in glove to assist the latter build nuclear capability. The point was not lost on Africans; to them, the long-standing secretive collaboration between the settler communities was bolstering the Apartheid machine and therefore working against the interests of the liberation movement at large.
See Daily Nation (2002) “SADC in plea to Zimbabwe”, January 15th , Nairobi, Kenya, p.12.
See Daily Nation (2002) “Zimbabwe passes new laws”, January 18th, Nairobi, Kenya, p.12.
ibid, p.12.
See Daily Nation (2001) “US House calls for Zimbabwe sanctions” December 6th, Nairobi, Kenya, p.14.
See Sunday Nation (2002) “Censure Mugabe, says Tutu”, January 13th, Nairobi Kenya, p.7.
op. cit Daily Nation (2002) “SADC in pleas to Zimbabwe”, p.12
See Daily Nation (2002) “UN criticizes Mugabe” January 17th, Nairobi, Kenya, p.13.
In a politically surprising announcement (November, 2000), Chiluba was to drop his disenfranchising charge against Kaunda. Kaunda responded by saying that Chiluba did not have a case all along and that his act was a demonstration of his political cowardice.
Apparently, it transpired that Guei was holed up in a hideout inside the country contradicting earlier rumours about his unceremonious exit.
Gbagbo repeated the stance taken by his predecessors of disenfranchising Ouattara.
See The East African "EU Concerned About Zanzibar", Nation Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, October 16th-22nd, 2000, p.36. The weekly publication notes: "There have been reports of police harassing opposition supporters, disrupting party meetings, conducting unwarranted house searches, in barring meetings of more than two persons in the streets of Zanzibar…The Electoral Commission has also been accused of omitting hundreds of CUF supporters from the voters' roll, in a move to reduce the number of opposition votes".
Consider, for instance, the announcement made in December, 2000, by the donor community to resume development aid. It was reported that the aid-givers were "..satisfied with the leadership of the newly elected Zanzibar President.." For this stance, see The East African, "Donors May Resume Aid to Zanzibar", December 25-31, 2000, p.1, Nairobi, Kenya.
Note the remarks made by the American Ambassador to Tanzania, Rev, Charles Stith, when he unabashedly endorsed through praise the new CCM government of Zanzibar. See ibid, The East African, p.28.
Ibid, p. 28.
The initiative appears to have been triggered by two broad concerns: one, consternation over Israel’s illegal occupation of Arab lands seized during wars, and two, the realization that Israel and the then South African Apartheid regime were working hard in glove to assist the latter build nuclear capability. The point was not lost on Africans; to them, the long-standing secretive collaboration between the settler communities was bolstering the Apartheid machine and therefore working against the interests of the liberation movement at large.
See Daily Nation (2002) “SADC in plea to Zimbabwe”, January 15th , Nairobi, Kenya, p.12.
See Daily Nation (2002) “Zimbabwe passes new laws”, January 18th, Nairobi, Kenya, p.12.
ibid, p.12.
See Daily Nation (2001) “US House calls for Zimbabwe sanctions” December 6th, Nairobi, Kenya, p.14.
See Sunday Nation (2002) “Censure Mugabe, says Tutu”, January 13th, Nairobi Kenya, p.7.
op. cit Daily Nation (2002) “SADC in pleas to Zimbabwe”, p.12
See Daily Nation (2002) “UN criticizes Mugabe” January 17th, Nairobi, Kenya, p.13.
Timamy, M. K. (2005). Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 4(1&2), 46-88.
AMA
Timamy MK. Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Haziran 2005;4(1&2):46-88.
Chicago
Timamy, M.h. Khalil. “Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 4, sy. 1&2 (Haziran 2005): 46-88.
EndNote
Timamy MK (01 Haziran 2005) Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 4 1&2 46–88.
IEEE
M. K. Timamy, “Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, c. 4, sy. 1 & 2, ss. 46–88, 2005.
ISNAD
Timamy, M.h. Khalil. “Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 4/1 & 2 (Haziran 2005), 46-88.
JAMA
Timamy MK. Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. 2005;4:46–88.
MLA
Timamy, M.h. Khalil. “Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, c. 4, sy. 1&2, 2005, ss. 46-88.
Vancouver
Timamy MK. Control Freakery and the Moral Hazard Problem in Sub Saharan Africa. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. 2005;4(1&2):46-88.