Araştırma Makalesi
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The geopolitical Strategy Türkiye, Iran and Morocco in Sahel

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 2, 243 - 267, 30.12.2025
https://doi.org/10.71313/asa.1736628

Öz

Sahel'deki kargaşa, bölgede sürekli değişen siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel bir manzara ortaya çıkarmıştır. Küresel kuzeyin emperyalist ve sömürgeci hareketlerinin uzun süredir hedefi olan ve iç çatışmalar, iç savaşlar ve mezhepsel çatışmaların kurbanı olan bu bölge, marjinalleşmeden muzdarip olmaya devam etmektedir. Fransız sömürgecilerin Sahel'den çekilmesi, İran, Türkiye ve Fas gibi yeni güçlerin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu ülkeler bölgede önemli bir rol oynamakta ve yeni jeopolitik ve ekonomik haritayı yeniden şekillendirmektedir. Sahel'i tarihsel ve siyasi olarak karakterize eden istikrarsızlık ve dış müdahale ışığında, bu çalışma, yeni bölgesel katılım ve işbirliği biçimlerinin geleneksel, kuzeye odaklı kalkınma ve kontrol modellerine nasıl alternatifler sunabileceğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca, bu makale, değişen Türkiye-Afrika ilişkilerini ve bunların bölgesel ve küresel jeopolitik üzerindeki etkisini derinlemesine incelemekle birlikte, İran'ın bölgedeki ideolojik, ekonomik ve askeri perspektiflerini de incelemektedir. Son olarak, makale Fas'ın yeni Atlantik Girişimlerini ve Mali, Nijer ve Burkina Faso ile olan ittifaklarını vurgulamaktadır. ve bölgedeki Fas yeni jeopolitik strateji.

Proje Numarası

ORCID: 0009-0006-0150-7999

Kaynakça

  • Abderrafie Zaanoun. (2024). “Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative and Potential Challenges to Regional Leadership,”. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/10/moroccos-atlantic-initiative-and-potential-challenges-to-regional-leadership.
  • Arpa, E., & Bayar, M. (2022). Türk dış yardım modeli: Afrika örneği. Journal of Area Studies, 1(2), 1–17. Dergi Park.
  • Askar, A. (2020). Turkey’s Expansion in the Sahel, the Sahara, and West Africa: Motivations and Ramifications, EPC, August 2020. Emirate Policy Center. https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/turkeys-expansion-in-the-sahel-the-sahara-and-west-africa-motivations-and-ramifications.
  • Ayatollah, R. K., & Iran Policy Center. (2023, November). How Iran exports its ideology. United Against Nuclear Iran.
  • Baez, K. (2024,18 Haziran). Türkiye, Somali ile iki büyük anlaşma imzaladı: Bunları hayata geçirebilecek mi? Atlantic Council.
  • Balima, S. (2024). The AES countries' exit from ECOWAS and the building of regional security,2–3. Thomas Sankara University; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/21558.pdf.
  • Bassou, Abdelhak. 2025.« Le Maroc dans la cartographie de l’Afrique atlantique : la communauté d’intérêts neutralise les paradoxes » . Policy Center for the New South.
  • Berriane, J. (2020). Sub-Saharan students in Morocco: Determinants. The Journal of North African Studies, 20(4), 3–4. HAL Open Science.
  • Baida, T. (2021, March). Moroccan Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 50- 51. Hal Open Science Center. No: ffhal-03164193f.https://hal.science/hal-03164193v1/document.
  • Bolarinwa, O. O. (2017). Morocco–West Africa relations. Nigeria Journal of International Affairs, 43(1–2), 58–59. Bouvier, E. (2024, Juin). La présence croissante de l’Iran en Afrique. Les cles Moyen -Orient. https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/La-presence-croissante-de-l-Iran-en Afrique.html.
  • Brooks, M. (2011). Turkish-African Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Virginia Wesleyan University.Research Gate.
  • Cannon, B., & Donelli, F. (2025). Beyond national boundaries: Unpacking Türkiye’s role in the Sahel and beyond through geopolitical imagination. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2025.2456024.
  • Cam, M. L. (2021). L’influence croissante de la Turquie au Sahel suscite l’inquiétude suscite l’inquiétude. Le Monde d'Afrique.
  • Cherkaoui, N. &. (2021). The Maghreb’s Outlook Towards the Sahel: An Analysis of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania Standpoints. Policy Center for the New South,19-21.
  • CEN-SAD. (2025, November). Member States. CEN-SAD, https://censad.int/en/who-are-we/member-states/. Chikin, M. (2025). Who Will Open the Gates to the Sahel? GEOFOR, Center for Geopolitical Forecast. https://geofor.ru/en/news/3442/.
  • C.I.A.T.(2021).«Construction Sector in Africa 11-13. Company Istanbul Africa Trade.
  • Dafir, A. (2012). La Diplomatie Economique Marocaine en Afrique Subsaharienne : Réalités et en jeux. DOI:10.3917/geoec 063. 0073.Géoéconomie63(4):73-83. Research Gate.
  • DEIK. (2025, Ağustos). DEİK ile Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu (ECOWAS) arasında işbirliği anlaşması imzalandı. DEIK.
  • Dirk, K. (2024). Expanding horizons: Iran’s strategic engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa – Insights from South Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania, MPRA Paper No. 121656, 4–5. GIGA, Institute for African Affairs, Hamburg.
  • Faitour, Mouad. 2024. «Morocco’s Distinctive Islam at a Crossroads: The State’s Support for Sufism. » Düzenleyen: The University of Georgia, Athens Department of Religion.
  • Front, I. P. (2018, January). Iran Ready to Manufacture Tractor in Senegal: FM. Iran Front Page. By IFP Editorial Staff, 2018. https://ifpnews.com/iran-ready-manufacture-tractor- senegal-fm/.
  • Gumrukcu, T. (2024). Turkey to seek improved Africa cooperation in Djibouti talks, officials say, Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-seek-improved-africa-cooperation-djibouti-talks-officials-say-2024-10-25/.
  • Ibrahim Kanazoe, B. O. (2022). Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies in the Sahel Region. Istanbul Ticaret University, Turkey,45-46.
  • IISS. (2023). The coup in Niger. 29 ,21Publisher: IISS https://www.itssverona.it/turkiye-the-new-regional-hegemonic-power-in-africa.
  • Touazi, A. S. I. (2025, January). Türkiye, the new regional hegemonic power in Africa. ITSS, The International Team for the Study of Security – Verona.
  • Inanc, B. Y. (2023). Africa coups: As France's influence teeters in the Sahel, can Turkey take advantage? Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/africa-sahel-turkey-france-influence-take-advantage.
  • Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, D. A. (2022). Turkey’s “anti-colonial” pivot to Mali: French-Turkish competition and the role of the European Union. Hellenic Foundation for European& Foreign. Policy. Academia.
  • United States, C. I. R. F. (2021). Islam in Africa. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/uscirf-spotlight/islam-africa.
  • Jason Warner, C. J. (2013). Iran-Africa relations the troubled bridge of Third World dialog.Taylor Francis.
  • Karr, L. (2024, July). Africa File: Turkish Inroads in Niger; al Shabaab’s Continued SVBIED Threat. Critical Threats. Leichtman, M. A., & Alrebh, A. F. (2017). Shiʿi preaching in West Africa: The Dakar sermons of Lebanese Shaykhal-Zayn.Taylor Francis.
  • Lob, E. (2022). In the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa. E. Lob içinde, Iran’s foreign policy and developmental activities in Africa (s. Abstract). Florida International University. https://discovery.fiu.edu/display/pub256741. lo, Alioune Aboutalib. 2024. «The economic dimension of Türkiye-Senegal relations. » Dergi park (https://doi.org/10.33722/afes.1595685) 13 (1,16).
  • Lyammouri, R., & Ghoulidi, A. (2024). Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative: A Catalyst for Sahel-Saharan Integration Policy.
  • Mattes, E. H. (2016, April). Die regionalen Ambitionen Marokkos in Westafrika: Strategie – Aktivitäten – Erfolgsbilanz. GIGA Research Programme.
  • Mi. (2021, June 3). Turkey's Maghreb–West Africa economic architecture: Challenges and opportunities for the European Union. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies.
  • Mold, A. (2022). “The Economic Significance of Intra-African Trade: Getting the Narrative Right. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Economic significance_of_intra-African_trade.pdf.
  • Nathan, L. (2010). Review of The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, by Ian Taylor. Research Gate. OEC. (2022). Iran – Nigeria Trade. Observatory of Economic Complexity. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/irn/partner/ner
  • Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2024). Türkiye–Burkina Faso Bilateral Trade Profile. OEC. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/bfa.
  • Ozkan, M. (2011). Turkey’s opening to Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies.Research Gate. DOI:10.1017/S0022278X10000595.
  • Parens, R. (2025). Turkey's Expanding Influence in Africa: Goals and Challenges. Policy Commons.https://policycommons.net/artifacts/20093184/what-does-turkey-want-in-africa/20993709/.
  • Raphael, P. (2025, March). Türkiye returns to Africa. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/turkeys-return-to-africa/
  • RFI. (2022). La Turquie livre six drones Bayraktar TB2 au Niger. RFI.
  • Ridley, N. (2019). Turkish–African relations: An institutionalist approach of Turkey. Dergi Park, 2, 24–25.
  • Rodman, N. (2023). From Tehran to Ouagadougou: Iran Finds Geopolitical Opportunities In Burkina Faso. Hoover Institution.
  • Schiavi, F. S. (2023). Iran’s Quest for Influence in Africa. Nato Foundation Defense College. https://www.natofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/NDCF-Paper-Schiavi-Iran-rise-in-Africa-r.pdf
  • Selma, R. Z. (2025). Moroccan firms in Sub-Saharan Africa: a strategic partnership for win-win cooperation. African Scientific Journal.
  • Slaski, B. (2023, Octobre). La politique Africaine de la Turquie. Telos. https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/politique-francaise-et-internationale/la-politique-africaine-de-la-turquie.html.
  • Şeker, C. T. (2017). Iran’in Afrika Politikasi Ve Karşilaşilan Zorluklar: Ahmedi Nejad Dönemi, 2005 – 2013. Dergi Park. 103-104.
  • Şeker, C. T. (2017). Iran’s Africa policy and its confrontations during the Ahmadinejad era,2005–2013. Dergi Park, 1(1), 84–116
  • Şeker, Cafer Talha. 2017. «Iran’in Afrika Politikasi Ve Karşilaşilan Zorluklar: Ahmedi Nejad Dönemi, 2005 – 2013. » Dergi Park, 92-93.
  • Tadlaoui, G. (2015). Morocco’s religious diplomacy in Africa. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior.FRIDE.
  • Tanchun, M. (2021, June). Turkey's Economic Structure in The Maghreb and West Africa. Center for Applied Turkey Studies, 18-19.
  • Tanchüm, M. (2020). Morocco ‘s Africa-to-Europe Commercial Corridor: Gatekeeper of an emerging trans-regional strategic architecture. Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheits politik.
  • Toğa, O. (2024, March). Iran's Approach to the African Continent and Its Strategic Objectives. Center for Iranian Studies.https://iramcenter.org/en/irans-approach-to-the-african-continent-and-its-strategic-objectives_en-2470.
  • Tolga, S. (2021). Defense Industry as a Power Instrument in Turkish Foreign Policy. Center of Diplomatic Affairs and Political Studies.
  • Turhan, Y. (2021). Türkiye Sahra Altı Afrika Ilişkileri, Ekonomik Ortaklıktan Stratejik Ortaklığa. Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. Research Gate.
  • Unit, I. S. (2020). Iranian presence in East Africa: Goals, Tools and Prospects. Iran Studies Unit. https://epc.ae/en/about-us/researchers/603.
  • United States, C. I. R. F. (2021). Islam in Africa. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/uscirf-spotlight/islam-africa.
  • Yazan, Z. A. Z. (2025). Relations between Morocco and West Africa: Paths to sustainable development and regional integration. Fez University,11(18s),2106. https://www.theaspd.com/ijes.php.
  • Yılmaz, C. E. (2014). Turkey’s Strategic Economic Relations with Africa: Journal of Economics and Political Economy, 226-227.

Türkiye Iran and Morocco Influence in Sahel

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 2, 243 - 267, 30.12.2025
https://doi.org/10.71313/asa.1736628

Öz

Sahel'deki kargaşa, bölgede sürekli değişen siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel bir manzara ortaya çıkarmıştır. Küresel kuzeyin emperyalist ve sömürgeci hareketlerinin uzun süredir hedefi olan ve iç çatışmalar, iç savaşlar ve mezhepsel çatışmaların kurbanı olan bu bölge, marjinalleşmeden muzdarip olmaya devam etmektedir. Fransız sömürgecilerin Sahel'den çekilmesi, İran, Türkiye ve Fas gibi yeni güçlerin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu ülkeler bölgede önemli bir rol oynamakta ve yeni jeopolitik ve ekonomik haritayı yeniden şekillendirmektedir. Sahel'i tarihsel ve siyasi olarak karakterize eden istikrarsızlık ve dış müdahale ışığında, bu çalışma, yeni bölgesel katılım ve işbirliği biçimlerinin geleneksel, kuzeye odaklı kalkınma ve kontrol modellerine nasıl alternatifler sunabileceğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca, bu makale, değişen Türkiye-Afrika ilişkilerini ve bunların bölgesel ve küresel jeopolitik üzerindeki etkisini derinlemesine incelemekle birlikte, İran'ın bölgedeki ideolojik, ekonomik ve askeri perspektiflerini de incelemektedir. Son olarak, makale Fas'ın yeni Atlantik Girişimlerini ve Mali, Nijer ve Burkina Faso ile olan ittifaklarını vurgulamaktadır. ve bölgedeki Fas yeni jeopolitik strateji.

Proje Numarası

ORCID: 0009-0006-0150-7999

Teşekkür

I am deeply grateful to all the members of the editorial committee for their valuable time and thoughtful evaluation of this article.

Kaynakça

  • Abderrafie Zaanoun. (2024). “Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative and Potential Challenges to Regional Leadership,”. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/10/moroccos-atlantic-initiative-and-potential-challenges-to-regional-leadership.
  • Arpa, E., & Bayar, M. (2022). Türk dış yardım modeli: Afrika örneği. Journal of Area Studies, 1(2), 1–17. Dergi Park.
  • Askar, A. (2020). Turkey’s Expansion in the Sahel, the Sahara, and West Africa: Motivations and Ramifications, EPC, August 2020. Emirate Policy Center. https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/turkeys-expansion-in-the-sahel-the-sahara-and-west-africa-motivations-and-ramifications.
  • Ayatollah, R. K., & Iran Policy Center. (2023, November). How Iran exports its ideology. United Against Nuclear Iran.
  • Baez, K. (2024,18 Haziran). Türkiye, Somali ile iki büyük anlaşma imzaladı: Bunları hayata geçirebilecek mi? Atlantic Council.
  • Balima, S. (2024). The AES countries' exit from ECOWAS and the building of regional security,2–3. Thomas Sankara University; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/21558.pdf.
  • Bassou, Abdelhak. 2025.« Le Maroc dans la cartographie de l’Afrique atlantique : la communauté d’intérêts neutralise les paradoxes » . Policy Center for the New South.
  • Berriane, J. (2020). Sub-Saharan students in Morocco: Determinants. The Journal of North African Studies, 20(4), 3–4. HAL Open Science.
  • Baida, T. (2021, March). Moroccan Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 50- 51. Hal Open Science Center. No: ffhal-03164193f.https://hal.science/hal-03164193v1/document.
  • Bolarinwa, O. O. (2017). Morocco–West Africa relations. Nigeria Journal of International Affairs, 43(1–2), 58–59. Bouvier, E. (2024, Juin). La présence croissante de l’Iran en Afrique. Les cles Moyen -Orient. https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/La-presence-croissante-de-l-Iran-en Afrique.html.
  • Brooks, M. (2011). Turkish-African Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Virginia Wesleyan University.Research Gate.
  • Cannon, B., & Donelli, F. (2025). Beyond national boundaries: Unpacking Türkiye’s role in the Sahel and beyond through geopolitical imagination. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2025.2456024.
  • Cam, M. L. (2021). L’influence croissante de la Turquie au Sahel suscite l’inquiétude suscite l’inquiétude. Le Monde d'Afrique.
  • Cherkaoui, N. &. (2021). The Maghreb’s Outlook Towards the Sahel: An Analysis of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania Standpoints. Policy Center for the New South,19-21.
  • CEN-SAD. (2025, November). Member States. CEN-SAD, https://censad.int/en/who-are-we/member-states/. Chikin, M. (2025). Who Will Open the Gates to the Sahel? GEOFOR, Center for Geopolitical Forecast. https://geofor.ru/en/news/3442/.
  • C.I.A.T.(2021).«Construction Sector in Africa 11-13. Company Istanbul Africa Trade.
  • Dafir, A. (2012). La Diplomatie Economique Marocaine en Afrique Subsaharienne : Réalités et en jeux. DOI:10.3917/geoec 063. 0073.Géoéconomie63(4):73-83. Research Gate.
  • DEIK. (2025, Ağustos). DEİK ile Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu (ECOWAS) arasında işbirliği anlaşması imzalandı. DEIK.
  • Dirk, K. (2024). Expanding horizons: Iran’s strategic engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa – Insights from South Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania, MPRA Paper No. 121656, 4–5. GIGA, Institute for African Affairs, Hamburg.
  • Faitour, Mouad. 2024. «Morocco’s Distinctive Islam at a Crossroads: The State’s Support for Sufism. » Düzenleyen: The University of Georgia, Athens Department of Religion.
  • Front, I. P. (2018, January). Iran Ready to Manufacture Tractor in Senegal: FM. Iran Front Page. By IFP Editorial Staff, 2018. https://ifpnews.com/iran-ready-manufacture-tractor- senegal-fm/.
  • Gumrukcu, T. (2024). Turkey to seek improved Africa cooperation in Djibouti talks, officials say, Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-seek-improved-africa-cooperation-djibouti-talks-officials-say-2024-10-25/.
  • Ibrahim Kanazoe, B. O. (2022). Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies in the Sahel Region. Istanbul Ticaret University, Turkey,45-46.
  • IISS. (2023). The coup in Niger. 29 ,21Publisher: IISS https://www.itssverona.it/turkiye-the-new-regional-hegemonic-power-in-africa.
  • Touazi, A. S. I. (2025, January). Türkiye, the new regional hegemonic power in Africa. ITSS, The International Team for the Study of Security – Verona.
  • Inanc, B. Y. (2023). Africa coups: As France's influence teeters in the Sahel, can Turkey take advantage? Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/africa-sahel-turkey-france-influence-take-advantage.
  • Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, D. A. (2022). Turkey’s “anti-colonial” pivot to Mali: French-Turkish competition and the role of the European Union. Hellenic Foundation for European& Foreign. Policy. Academia.
  • United States, C. I. R. F. (2021). Islam in Africa. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/uscirf-spotlight/islam-africa.
  • Jason Warner, C. J. (2013). Iran-Africa relations the troubled bridge of Third World dialog.Taylor Francis.
  • Karr, L. (2024, July). Africa File: Turkish Inroads in Niger; al Shabaab’s Continued SVBIED Threat. Critical Threats. Leichtman, M. A., & Alrebh, A. F. (2017). Shiʿi preaching in West Africa: The Dakar sermons of Lebanese Shaykhal-Zayn.Taylor Francis.
  • Lob, E. (2022). In the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa. E. Lob içinde, Iran’s foreign policy and developmental activities in Africa (s. Abstract). Florida International University. https://discovery.fiu.edu/display/pub256741. lo, Alioune Aboutalib. 2024. «The economic dimension of Türkiye-Senegal relations. » Dergi park (https://doi.org/10.33722/afes.1595685) 13 (1,16).
  • Lyammouri, R., & Ghoulidi, A. (2024). Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative: A Catalyst for Sahel-Saharan Integration Policy.
  • Mattes, E. H. (2016, April). Die regionalen Ambitionen Marokkos in Westafrika: Strategie – Aktivitäten – Erfolgsbilanz. GIGA Research Programme.
  • Mi. (2021, June 3). Turkey's Maghreb–West Africa economic architecture: Challenges and opportunities for the European Union. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies.
  • Mold, A. (2022). “The Economic Significance of Intra-African Trade: Getting the Narrative Right. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Economic significance_of_intra-African_trade.pdf.
  • Nathan, L. (2010). Review of The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, by Ian Taylor. Research Gate. OEC. (2022). Iran – Nigeria Trade. Observatory of Economic Complexity. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/irn/partner/ner
  • Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2024). Türkiye–Burkina Faso Bilateral Trade Profile. OEC. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/bfa.
  • Ozkan, M. (2011). Turkey’s opening to Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies.Research Gate. DOI:10.1017/S0022278X10000595.
  • Parens, R. (2025). Turkey's Expanding Influence in Africa: Goals and Challenges. Policy Commons.https://policycommons.net/artifacts/20093184/what-does-turkey-want-in-africa/20993709/.
  • Raphael, P. (2025, March). Türkiye returns to Africa. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/turkeys-return-to-africa/
  • RFI. (2022). La Turquie livre six drones Bayraktar TB2 au Niger. RFI.
  • Ridley, N. (2019). Turkish–African relations: An institutionalist approach of Turkey. Dergi Park, 2, 24–25.
  • Rodman, N. (2023). From Tehran to Ouagadougou: Iran Finds Geopolitical Opportunities In Burkina Faso. Hoover Institution.
  • Schiavi, F. S. (2023). Iran’s Quest for Influence in Africa. Nato Foundation Defense College. https://www.natofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/NDCF-Paper-Schiavi-Iran-rise-in-Africa-r.pdf
  • Selma, R. Z. (2025). Moroccan firms in Sub-Saharan Africa: a strategic partnership for win-win cooperation. African Scientific Journal.
  • Slaski, B. (2023, Octobre). La politique Africaine de la Turquie. Telos. https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/politique-francaise-et-internationale/la-politique-africaine-de-la-turquie.html.
  • Şeker, C. T. (2017). Iran’in Afrika Politikasi Ve Karşilaşilan Zorluklar: Ahmedi Nejad Dönemi, 2005 – 2013. Dergi Park. 103-104.
  • Şeker, C. T. (2017). Iran’s Africa policy and its confrontations during the Ahmadinejad era,2005–2013. Dergi Park, 1(1), 84–116
  • Şeker, Cafer Talha. 2017. «Iran’in Afrika Politikasi Ve Karşilaşilan Zorluklar: Ahmedi Nejad Dönemi, 2005 – 2013. » Dergi Park, 92-93.
  • Tadlaoui, G. (2015). Morocco’s religious diplomacy in Africa. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior.FRIDE.
  • Tanchun, M. (2021, June). Turkey's Economic Structure in The Maghreb and West Africa. Center for Applied Turkey Studies, 18-19.
  • Tanchüm, M. (2020). Morocco ‘s Africa-to-Europe Commercial Corridor: Gatekeeper of an emerging trans-regional strategic architecture. Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheits politik.
  • Toğa, O. (2024, March). Iran's Approach to the African Continent and Its Strategic Objectives. Center for Iranian Studies.https://iramcenter.org/en/irans-approach-to-the-african-continent-and-its-strategic-objectives_en-2470.
  • Tolga, S. (2021). Defense Industry as a Power Instrument in Turkish Foreign Policy. Center of Diplomatic Affairs and Political Studies.
  • Turhan, Y. (2021). Türkiye Sahra Altı Afrika Ilişkileri, Ekonomik Ortaklıktan Stratejik Ortaklığa. Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. Research Gate.
  • Unit, I. S. (2020). Iranian presence in East Africa: Goals, Tools and Prospects. Iran Studies Unit. https://epc.ae/en/about-us/researchers/603.
  • United States, C. I. R. F. (2021). Islam in Africa. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/uscirf-spotlight/islam-africa.
  • Yazan, Z. A. Z. (2025). Relations between Morocco and West Africa: Paths to sustainable development and regional integration. Fez University,11(18s),2106. https://www.theaspd.com/ijes.php.
  • Yılmaz, C. E. (2014). Turkey’s Strategic Economic Relations with Africa: Journal of Economics and Political Economy, 226-227.
Toplam 59 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular Afrika Çalışmaları, Bölgesel Çalışmalar
Bölüm Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar

Sophia Ünver Elanzouli 0009-0006-0150-7999

Proje Numarası ORCID: 0009-0006-0150-7999
Gönderilme Tarihi 7 Temmuz 2025
Kabul Tarihi 26 Kasım 2025
Yayımlanma Tarihi 30 Aralık 2025
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2025 Cilt: 3 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA Ünver Elanzouli, S. (2025). Türkiye Iran and Morocco Influence in Sahel. ASA Dergisi, 3(2), 243-267. https://doi.org/10.71313/asa.1736628

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