THE NEED FOR DIRECT STATE REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ‘TAKEOVER CODE’ FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN THE UK

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 5 Sayı: 2, 677 - 708, 30.12.2023

Alptekin Koksal

https://doi.org/10.47136/asbuhfd.1356121

Öz

The Takeover Code and Panel are integral to the regulation of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and have a substantial role in controlling mergers and acquisitions which involve publicly traded companies in the UK. They serve to safeguard the interests of shareholders, maintain the integrity of shareholders and promote transparency in takeover processes in the UK. Therefore, undertakings somehow involved in takeover processes and bids must adhere to the Takeover Codes’ rules. In line with the Takeover Code, the Takeover Panel plays a crucial role in overseeing and enforcing the rules of the Takeover Code. However, the success of the Takeover Code and Panel is argued a lot lately. This article critically evaluates whether the historical development, substantive rules and current practice of the Takeover Panel and Code demonstrate a failure of self-regulation (market regulation). As a result, the need for direct state regulation of the market for corporate control is found. Thus, the remedy to the problem arising from the nature of the Takeover Code is searched in line with the Panel decisions, statutes and academic commentary.

Anahtar Kelimeler

mergers and acquisitions, The Takeover Code and Panel, competition law, corporate control, self-regulation

BİRLEŞMELER VE DEVRALMALAR İÇİN İLKE KARARLARI’ ÇERÇEVESİNDE BİRLEŞİK KRALLIKTA ŞİRKET KONTROLÜ AMACIYLA PİYASAYA DOĞRUDAN DEVLET MÜDAHALESİ İHTİYACI

Öz

Birleşmeler ve Devralmalar için İlke Kararları ve Devralmalar Paneli, Birleşik Krallık'ta halka açık şirketlerin dahil olduğu birleşme ve devralmaların kontrolünde önemli bir role sahiptir ve birleşme ve devralmaların düzenlenmesinin ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. İlgili yasa ve panel Birleşik Krallık'ta hissedarların çıkarlarını korumaya, hissedarların bağımsızlığını tesis etmeye ve devralma süreçlerinde şeffaflığı teşvik etmeye hizmet eder. Bu nedenle, bir şekilde devralma süreçlerine dahil olan teşebbüslerin, Devralma ve Birleşmeler için İlke Kararlarına uyması gerekmektedir. Devralma ve Birleşmeler için İlke Kararları uyarınca, Devralmalar Paneli, kuralların gözetimi ve uygulanmasında önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Ancak son dönemde Birleşmeler ve Devralmalar için İlke Kararları ve Devralmalar Panelinin başarısı çokça eleştirilmektedir. Bu makale, Devralma Paneli ve Kurallarının tarihsel gelişiminin, temel kurallarının ve mevcut uygulamasının kendi kendini düzenleme (piyasa düzenlemesi) başarısızlığını gösterip göstermediğini eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirmektedir. Çıkarılan sonuç ise, kurumsal kontrol için piyasanın doğrudan devlet düzenlemesine ihtiyaç duymakta olduğudur. Bu sebeple Birleşmeler ve Devralmalar için İlke Kararlarının niteliğinden kaynaklanan sorunların çözümünde bizzat Panelin kararlarından, mevzuattan ve akademik yorumlardan yola çıkarak tavsiyeler aranmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

rekabet hukuku, birleşme ve devralmalar, piyasa düzenlemesi, Birleşmeler ve Devralmalar için İlke Kararları

Kaynakça

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