The Golan Heights Issue in The Israel-Syria Conflict

Öz

The Golan Heights were occupied by Israel after the 1967 War and officially annexed in 1981. The Golan Heights issue, which has been awaiting a solution for more than half a century between the parties after the 1967 War, continues to be a potential source of tension in the region and is still a problem far from being resolved today. The fact that the Golan Heights remain a problem far from being resolved between the parties is effective in that it provides the parties with a strategic depth advantage. In this context, Israel’s strategic interests on the Golan Heights have been examined within the framework of the defensible border’s strategy. Within the specified framework, a qualitative study method has been adopted by examining the existing literature. As a result of the information obtained within the framework of the defensible borders strategy, it has become clear that the Golan Heights are of indispensable importance for Israel in terms of security and water resources. As a result of the parties seeing each other as potential enemies, Israel’s unwillingness to lose the strategic depth advantage provided by the Golan Heights has caused the issue to remain unresolved. However, it is understood that the uncertainty of the future of the Golan Heights serves Israel’s short-term interests.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Golan Heights
• Israel
• Syria
• Strategic Depth
• Defensible Border

İsrail-Suriye Anlaşmazlığında Golan Tepeleri Sorunu

Öz

Golan Tepeleri, 1967 Savaşı sonrası İsrail tarafından işgal edilmiş, 1981 yılında ise resmen ilhak edilmiştir. 1967 Savaşı sonrasında taraflar arasında yarım yüzyılı aşkın bir süredir çözümü bekleyen Golan Tepeleri sorunu, bölgede potansiyel gerilim kaynağı olmaya ve günümüzde hala çözüme uzak bir sorun olmaya devam etmektedir. Golan Tepeleri’nin taraflar arasında çözüme uzak bir sorun olarak kalmasında, taraflara stratejik derinlik avantajı sağlaması etkili olmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, İsrail’in Golan Tepeleri üzerindeki stratejik çıkarları, savunulabilir sınırlar stratejisi çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Belirtilen çerçevede mevcut literatür incelenerek nitel bir çalışma yöntemi benimsenmiştir. Savunulabilir sınırlar stratejisi çerçevesinde edinilen bilgiler sonucunda, Golan Tepeleri’nin İsrail için güvenlik ve su kaynakları açısından vazgeçilmez bir öneme sahip olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Tarafların birbirlerini potansiyel düşman olarak görmesi sonucu İsrail’in Golan Tepeleri’nin sağladığı stratejik derinlik avantajını kaybetmek istememesi, sorunun çözümsüz kalmasına neden olmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Golan Tepeleri’nin geleceğinin belirsizliğinin, İsrail’in kısa vadeli çıkarlarına hizmet ettiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Golan Tepeleri
• İsrail
• Suriye
• Stratejik Derinlik
• Savunulabilir Sınırlar

Kaynakça

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