EndNote BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster

Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints

Yıl 2007, Cilt 2, Sayı 2, 01.12.2007

Öz

We depart from the usual assumption in noncooperative game theory that games arise exogenously. We assume instead that games between agents are formed endogenously in the sense that agents choose their opponents through a costly search process. Since agents are aware in this situation that both parties have the option of rejecting a match, they have an incentive to make themselves as attractive a partner as they can. This is accomplished in a pregame in which agents consider all the potential strategies in a game but choose to learn only a subset. We assume that this choice is observable by their potential partners in the matching game. We motivate this as a proxy for subscribing to a code of ethics, accepting a set of social norms, or being a member of a religious, philosophical, or political group. We show that agents will sometimes choose to constrain their actions sets in the pregame in order to achieve better matches and higher payoffs. We suggest that this might provide at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs.

Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints

Yıl 2007, Cilt 2, Sayı 2, 01.12.2007

Öz

We depart from the usual assumption in noncooperative game theory that games arise exogenously. We assume instead that games between agents are formed endogenously in the sense that agents choose their opponents through a costly search process. Since agents are aware in this situation that both parties have the option of rejecting a match, they have an incentive to make themselves as attractive a partner as they can. This is accomplished in a pregame in which agents consider all the potential strategies in a game but choose to learn only a subset. We assume that this choice is observable by their potential partners in the matching game. We motivate this as a proxy for subscribing to a code of ethics, accepting a set of social norms, or being a member of a religious, philosophical, or political group. We show that agents will sometimes choose to constrain their actions sets in the pregame in order to achieve better matches and higher payoffs. We suggest that this might provide at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Prof.dr.john P.CONLEY Bu kişi benim


Prof.dr.william S.NEİLSON Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Aralık 2007
Yayınlandığı Sayı Yıl 2007, Cilt 2, Sayı 2

Kaynak Göster

Bibtex @ { beyder47377, journal = {Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi}, eissn = {1308-3937}, address = {}, publisher = {İbrahim Güran YUMUŞAK}, year = {2007}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = { - }, title = {Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints}, key = {cite}, author = {P.conley, Prof.dr.john and S.neilson, Prof.dr.william} }
APA P.conley, P. & S.neilson, P. (2007). Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints . Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi , 2 (2) , . Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/beyder/issue/3483/47377
MLA P.conley, P. , S.neilson, P. "Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints" . Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi 2 (2007 ): <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/beyder/issue/3483/47377>
Chicago P.conley, P. , S.neilson, P. "Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints". Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi 2 (2007 ):
RIS TY - JOUR T1 - Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints AU - Prof.dr.johnP.conley, Prof.dr.williamS.neilson Y1 - 2007 PY - 2007 N1 - DO - T2 - Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi JF - Journal JO - JOR SP - EP - VL - 2 IS - 2 SN - -1308-3937 M3 - UR - Y2 - 2022 ER -
EndNote %0 Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints %A Prof.dr.john P.conley , Prof.dr.william S.neilson %T Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints %D 2007 %J Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi %P -1308-3937 %V 2 %N 2 %R %U
ISNAD P.conley, Prof.dr.john , S.neilson, Prof.dr.william . "Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints". Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi 2 / 2 (Aralık 2007): - .
AMA P.conley P. , S.neilson P. Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints. Journal of Knowlede Economy & Knowledge Management. 2007; 2(2): -.
Vancouver P.conley P. , S.neilson P. Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints. Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi. 2007; 2(2): -.
IEEE P. P.conley ve P. S.neilson , "Endogenous Games and The Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints", Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi, c. 2, sayı. 2, Ara. 2007