Two Tokens of the Inference to the Best Explanation: No-Miracle Argument and the Selectionist Explanation

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 5 Sayı: 1, 31 - 46, 13.07.2015

Emre Arda Erdenk

https://doi.org/10.18491/bijop.59053

Öz

In this paper, I evaluate van Fraassen’s critique of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by focusing mainly on his argument of bad lot. First, I argue that his attack is about the reliability of IBE as a rule of inference. Secondly, I evaluate the most famous realist IBE in the philosophy of science literature, namely the No-Miracle Argument (NMA). I stick to Mark Newman’s attack to realist NMA and admit his claim that NMA is viciously circular. Thirdly, I introduce the anti-realist alternative to the NMA, which is argued by van Fraassen, namely the Selectionist Explanation. Ultimately, I claim that, even though van Fraassen finds IBE wanting, SA has a form of IBE and thus it is a token of IBE as well.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Scientific realism, anti-realism, theoretical entities, observables, empirical adequacy.

Kaynakça

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