YAPAY ZEKA İÇİN YENİ KİŞİLİK MODELİ ÖNERİSİ: ENTEGRE KİŞİLİK

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 7 Sayı: 1, 311 - 363, 30.06.2025

Şerafettin Ekici

https://doi.org/10.55009/bilisimhukukudergisi.1686538

Öz

Yapay zeka (YZ) sistemleri birçok kritere göre çeşitli sınıflandırmalara tabi tutulmaktadır. Bu sınıflandırmalar arasında, yeteneklere, otonom hareket kapasitesine ve bilişsel kapasiteye dayalı sınıflandırma, yapay zekaya kişilik tanıma ile ilgili tartışmalarda özel bir öneme sahiptir.
Yeteneklere dayalı sınıflandırmada “Yapay Genel Zeka (AGI)” ve “Yapay Süper Zeka (ASI)”, otonom hareket kapasitesine dayalı sınıflandırmada “Tam Otonom Yapay Zeka (FAA)” ve bilişsel kapasiteye dayalı sınıflandırmada “Kendini Farkında Sistem (SAS)” özelliklerinin tamını birlikte taşıyan sistemler, Entegre Kişilik (InPer) olarak tanınmalıdır. InPer adı verilen yapay zeka sistemi, InPerAI olarak adlandırılmalıdır. InPerAI'nin bağımsız bir kişilik olmamalı, gerçek veya tüzel bir kişi olan “Ana Kişilik (MaPer)” ile entegre edilmelidir.
InPerAI, MaPer tarafından belirli görev ve işlemleri yerine getirmek üzere yetkilendirilebilir. Bu yetkilendirmeye dayanarak, doğrudan temsil yetkisine ilişkin hükümler InPerAI tarafından yapılan işlemlerde de geçerli olacaktır. Sonuç olarak, InPerAI tarafından edinilen hak ve yükümlülükler MaPer'e ait olacaktır.
InPerAI'nin haksız fiil sorumluluğu açısından, “tehlikeli hayvan sahiplerinin sorumluluğu”na benzer bir objektif özen yükümlülüğünün getirilmelidir. Ayrıca, MaPer'in zararın doğması ile ilgili her türlü önlemi aldığını veya zararın diğer tarafların eylemlerinden kaynaklandığını ispat ederek sorumluluktan kurtulabilmesi sağlanmalıdır. Buna ek olarak, InPerAI tarafından işlenen suçların cezai sorumluluğu da kural olarak MaPer'e atfedilmelidir. Ancak MaPer, her türlü önlemi almış olmasına rağmen suçun işlenmesini önleyemediğini veya suçun üretim hatasından veya başka bir kişinin sorumluluğundan kaynaklandığını kanıtlayabilirse, cezai sorumluluktan tamamen veya kısmen muaf tutulmalıdır. Suçun ortaya çıkmasına neden olan sorunun üreticiye atfedilmesi durumunda, üretici de cezai sorumluluktan sorumlu tutulmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Yapay Zeka , Entegre Kişilik , Yapay Zekanın Kişiliği , Yapay Süper Zeka

NEW PROPOSED PERSONALITY MODEL FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: INTEGRATED PERSONALITY

Öz

The classification of artificial intelligence (AI) systems is a multifaceted process, encompassing a wide range of criteria. Among these classifications, the categorisation based on capabilities, autonomous movement capacity, and cognitive capacity holds particular significance in the context of discussions concerning the recognition of personality in AI.
Systems that embody the characteristics of ‘Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)’ and ‘Artificial Superintelligence (ASI)’ in the classification based on capabilities, ‘Fully Autonomous AI (FAA)’ in the classification based on autonomous movement capacity, and ‘Self-Aware Systems (SAS)’ in the classification based on cognitive capacity should be recognised as Integrated Personality (InPer). The AI system that has been granted InPer will be designated InPerAI. It is important to note that InPerAI is not an independent personality, but must be integrated into a ‘Main Person (MaPer)’, which is a natural person or legal entity.
InPerAI may be authorised by MaPer to perform certain tasks and operations. Based on this authorisation, the provisions regarding direct representation authority will apply to the transactions made by the InPerAI. Consequently, the rights and obligations acquired by InPerAI shall belong to MaPer.
In terms of InPerAI’s tort liability, it is argued that an objective duty of care, akin to the 'liability of owners of dangerous animals', should be established. Furthermore, it is contended that MaPer should be able to exonerate itself from liability by demonstrating that it has taken every precaution or that the damage is attributable to the actions of other parties. In addition, it is posited that criminal liability for offences committed by InPerAI should also be attributed to MaPer. However, MaPer should be fully or partially absolved of criminal liability if he/she/it can demonstrate that, despite having taken every precaution, it could not prevent the commission of the offence, or that the offence was caused by the production or responsibility of another person. In the event that the problem is attributed to production, the manufacturer should also be held criminally liable.

Anahtar Kelimeler

AI , Integrated Personality , Personality of AI , Artificial Superintelligence , Fully Autonomous AI

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