Finansal Krizler ve Etkileri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

Öz

Finansal krizler farklı biçim ve boyutlarda gelir ve kalıcı etkilere sahip olurlar. Finansal piyasaların birbirleriyle bağlantısı arttıkça bir ülkedeki krizin başka bir ülkeye sirayeti olasılığı da arttığından, önceden alınan önlemler kadar, yaklaşan krizin tanım, tespit ve muhtemel etkilerinin bilinmesi de önemlidir. Bu çalışmada, finansal krizler, kur, ani duruş, borç ve bankacılık başlıkları altında tanımlanmış, tespit, sıklık ve dağılımları ele alınmış ve böylelikle yeni krizlerin yaşanmaması için alınması gereken tedbirlerin anlaşılmasına katkı sağlanması amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçla, finansal kriz dönemlerinde varlık ve kredi piyasalarındaki gelişmeleri inceleyen kuramsal ve pratik çalışmalar gözden geçirilmiştir. Finansal krizler ile ilgili literatürün haritası çıkarılarak, yeni araştırmalara zemin hazırlamak istenmiştir. Tartışmalarla gösterilmiştir ki finansal krizlere yatırımcıların rasyonel olmayan davranışlarından çok, politika yapıcıların miyop ve hatalı kararları ya da düzenleme ve denetim eksikliği gibi unsurlar sebep olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• ani duruş
• bankacılık krizleri
• borç krizleri
• finansal krizler
• kur krizleri

A Review of Financial Crises and Their Effects

Öz

Financial crises come in different shapes and sizes and have lasting effects. As the interconnectedness of financial markets increases, the possibility of the spread of a crisis in one country to another one also increases. So, knowing the definition, detection and possible effects of an approaching crisis is as important as the measures taken beforehand. In this study, financial crises are defined under the headings of exchange rate, sudden stop, debt and banking. Their detection, frequency and distribution are discussed, and thus it is aimed to contribute to the understanding of the measures that can be taken to avoid new crises. For this purpose, theoretical and practical studies examining developments in asset and credit markets during financial crisis periods are reviewed. By mapping the literature on financial crises, it was desired to lay the groundwork for new researches. It has been shown by discussions that rather than the irrational behaviour of investors, financial crises are caused by factors such as myopic and erroneous decisions of policy makers, or lack of regulation and supervision.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• sudden stops
• banking crises
• debt crises
• financial crises
• currency crises

Kaynakça

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