TÜRKİYE’DE TARIMSAL DESTEK POLİTİKALARI

Öz

Tarım destek politikaları tüm dünyada liberalleşme trendine rağmen etkinliğini sürdürmektedir. Özellikle gelişmiş birçok ülkede tarım halen en çok kollanan sektör olarak varlığına devam etmektedir. Ancak destekleme/kollama derecesi tarım alt sektörlerinde ve üretim dallarında oldukça büyük farklılıklar arzetmektedir. Bu çalışmada sektörün ekonomik/politik büyüklüğü ile desteklenme, kollanma oranı arasında doğrusal olmayan bir ilişki olduğunu varsayan Becker modeli test edildi. Türkiye’deki tarıma bağlı 12 üretim dalının verileri bu modeli doğruladı. Ayrıca ülke geliri arttıkça ve seçimlere yaklaştıkça tarım üretim dallarının daha fazla desteklendiği sonucu bulundu.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Tarım destek politikaları, Baskı Grupları

AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDY POLICIES IN TURKEY

Öz

Even though there has been a strong liberalization trend all over the world agricultural protectionist policies still sustain. Especially in developed countries agriculture continues to be the most protected sector of economy. However, protection level has shown great variations among subsectors of agriculture. In this study we test Becker Hypothesis which presumes a non-linear relationship between protection level and sector size. The data of 12 subsectors of Turkish agriculture has confirmed Becker Hypothesis predictions. In addition to that the study concludes that as the country gets wealthier and the election year gets closer, the protection levels of all agriculture subsectors rise.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Agricultural subsidy policies, Special interest groups

Kaynakça

1. ANDERSON, K. ve HAYAMI, Y., (1986). The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection. Allen & Unwin, London.
2. BALE, Malcolm ve Ernst LUTZ (1981) Price Distortions in Agriculture and Their Effects: An International Comparison American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 8-22
3. BASSİ, Sonia, Racem MEHDİ, (2001) Determinants of the European Union Agricultural Protectionism: Why are Mediterranean Products excluded from Trade Liberalization between EU and Mediterranean Countries? http://polis.unipmn.it/epcs/papers/bassi.pdf(31-12-2007)
4. BECKER, Gary, (1983) A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 371-400.
5. BROOKS, Jonathan (2003), Why Agricultural Policy is Still so Difficult to Reform? Seminar on Political Economy Aspects of Policy Coherence, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/16/31685281.pdf(31-12-2007)
6. GARDNER, B. (1987) Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs,. Journal of Political Economy 95:2: 290-310.
7. GROSSMAN Gene VE Elhanan. HELPMAN, (1994) “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review 84:4, pp. 833-850;
8. KRUEGER, A.O., SCHIFF, M. ve, VALDES, A., (1988). Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries. World Bank Econ. Rev. 2, 255-272.

9. OECD Agricultural Support, (2005) OECD, Paris.
10. PORTUGAL Louis, (2005) Methodology for the Measurement of Support and Use in Policy Evaluation, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/47/1937457.pdf(31-12-2007)
11. SWINNEN, Johan F.M., Harry DE GORTER, Gordon C. RAUSSER, ve Anurag BANERJEE (2000) The Political Economy of Public Research Investment and Commodity Policies in Agriculture: An Empirical Study. Agricultural Economics, 22:111-122