The Issue of Temporal Asymmetry in David lewis’s Concept of Counterfactual Dependence

Öz

David Lewis in his remarkable project of counterfactual analysis of causation tries to formulate causal relations in terms of counterfactual statements and his account of possible worlds that he introduces in his account of modal realism. Lewis’s analysis consists of many various aspects that could not all be looked up in this paper. Nonetheless, in this paper, I am going to evaluate one of the most famous components of his analysis and critically point out one of the most critical issue concerning counterfactual analysis; namely the “temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence”. I will argue that Lewis’s argument for the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence relies on the conceptual fiat that there is time asymmetry, even though Lewis himself would say that this claim is philosophically well argued

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Possible Worlds Semantics, Truth-Makers, Laws of Nature, Miracles

David Lewis’in Karşıt-Olgusal Bağlılık Kavramında Zamansal Asimetri Meselesi

Öz

David Lewis nedenselliğin karşıt-olgusal analizini yaptığı çarpıcı projesinde nedensel bağıntıları karşıt-olgusal önermeler ve kipsel gerçekçilik görüşünde ortaya koyduğu olası dünyalar görüşü ile formüle etmeye çalışır. Lewis’in analizi bu makalede ele alınamayacak kadar çok çeşitli yönlere sahiptir. Bununla birlikte, bu makalede, bu analizin önemli bir parçası olan ve karşıtolgusal analizin en kritik meselesi olarak nitelendirilebilecek “karşıt-olgusal bağlılığın zamansal asimetrisi” problemini ele alacağım. Lewis’in karşıt-olgusal bağlılığın zamansal asitmerisine dair olumlayıcı iddiasının kavramsal bir emri vaki olduğunu ve bunu iddianın, Lewis inkâr etse bile, felsefi temellendirme yönünden zayıf olduğunu göstereceğim

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Olası Dünyalar Semantiği, Doğru-Yapıcılar, Doğa Kanunu, Mucizeler

Kaynakça

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